#competition

Both of these companies need to strengthen their payment platforms before Stripe does their IPO.

Following the email from Cristiano, here are some things that I know and that I heard/read so far:

What's confirmed:

• Amon's layoff email.
• Confirmed cuts with some of my friends (and posts here0
• The exact % of ppl being laid off has not been confirmed publicly.

Rumors circulating:

• 7–9% layoffs across BUs and locations.
• Performance-based cuts - some are suggesting this I doubt it
• Org-dependent impact - % cut will vary by org - this is highly possible IMO, it'd follow the pattern from before.
• Timeline - rumors is that we have 1mo+ before more details become clear.
• New hires - People joining in Nov are puzzled - a number of roles in Automotive are starting in Nov - talked to a friend

Why cuts??? All speculative but come to mind

• Weak smartphone demand
• Rising memory prices
• Increasing competition from AAPL/Samsung
• Pricing power issues

Chime in if u have something to add, feel free to challenge any of these, I am puzzled and many of these may be inaccurate (aside from that top section)

More reason nike su-ks..

Yes, we have a lot of RIFs and it's really hard to watch our work friends leave all the time... but are there any competitors you think are worse places to work and you would never work there?

For me. "the Z word" or S&N. He-l to the no. The first can't win market share in any space they play in, and the latter is a failing company, imo.

Soon another Deepseek moment from China is about to rock OpenAI's bet on expensive datacenters. This could be what does Oracle in. Uh oh ;)

Thank goodness Elon doesn’t have have billions in order to compete ! Wait? What?

https://www.fool.com/investing/2026/10/14/elon-musk-says-spacex-just-bought-the-last-critica/

https://seekingalpha.com/news/4653057-sa-asks-how-much-of-a-threat-is-spacex-to-at-and-t-verizon-t-mobile?share_source=shared_news

Nike continues to lose market share among all teenagers in footwear, while On Running continues to gain, particularly among teenage boys, according to Piper Sandler.

https://www.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/piper-says-nike-continues-to-lose-teen-market-share-as-on-running-gains-93CH-4946334

https://finance.yahoo.com/technology/article/spacexs-starlink-could-pose-3-big-risks-to-apple-bofa-warns-175500290.html

The issues here is build out. Dish tired to build out a national network and failed for 1 simple reason. It will cost at least a 500 billion to build a national land based network that will give the same footprint as the big three. In a lot of cities, building permits for a cell tower takes 5 to 8 years to be issues. ATT, Verizon, T-mob have mature networks that have been build out for decades now. Yeah, you can come in with 500 billion in cash, but to compete head to head with the big three will take at least 20 years of building out and places like NYC, San Fran, LA... it's a 10 year process now to get a cell site build from start to finish and in NYC the cost is anywhere from 2, to 4 million just to build one cell site! Also the amount of spectrum in the 800 band is not very much and will only allow for a started build out, billions and billions more will have to be spent in spectrum buys. Dish was doomed, everyone knew it even the FCC and the SEC...! Dish was used to allow the T-Mob and Sprint merger to happen, it was the reason the merger was allowed, to get around all the SEC regs. However, everyone knew it was not possible and it failed. I am a 36 year RF engineer, at Verizon 17 years now.

I've noticed many folks are taking jobs with competitors and partners, while others are leaving the field altogether. Are they seeing something coming, or have they simply had enough?

Nike (NKE) has had a rough year so far, with shares down 46% year-to-date as it contends with a myriad of issues, including increased competition and shifting consumer tastes.

https://seekingalpha.com/news/4651946-sa-asks-how-can-nike-get-back-on-track

https://www.fierce-network.com/wireless/spacexs-800-mhz-spectrum-grab-threatens-big-3-mobile-carriers

Bo-m! SpaceX just inked a deal to buy 14 megahertz of paired 800 MHz spectrum from Grain Management, giving Starlink Mobile a means to more aggressively challenge the Big 3 U.S. mobile carriers on the ground.

Once it receives Federal Communications Commission (FCC) approval – a shoo-in given FCC Chairman Brendan Carr’s penchant for all things space and Elon Musk – Starlink Mobile will deploy a “flexible architecture combining our satellite-to-mobile constellation in space with an advanced terrestrial deployment that can seamlessly connect devices everywhere,” SpaceX said in its press release.

Shares in all three U.S. wireless carriers were down in early trading this morning. AT&T was down more than 6%, at $22.90. T-Mobile was down 10%, to $154.10, and Verizon was down 5.5%, at $43.13. Meanwhile, SpaceX shares were up about 1%, to $162.75.

Elon Musk just bought spectrum to be able to sell phone service. Most of Verizon customers are conservative and hate Verizon because of years of lying, outsourcing, over billing, and treating customers like sh-t and love Elon Musk for whatever reason good or bad. That’s why Verizon is desperately trying to eliminate employees and overhead. They know people will flock to Elon and SpaceX.

Verizon stock (NYSE: VZ) closed down 8.75% at $41.65 on Friday, October 9, 2026, marking its worst single-day drop since July 2002.

Key Reasons for the Drop

• SpaceX Spectrum Deal: The sell-off was triggered by news that SpaceX agreed to acquire a nationwide portfolio of low-band 800 MHz spectrum from Grain Management, combined with FCC authorization for thousands of direct-to-phone Starlink satellites.
• Direct-to-Cell Competition: Investors panicked that Starlink Mobile could combine satellite and terrestrial coverage to rival traditional carriers like Verizon, AT&T, and T-Mobile.
• Analyst Downgrades: Scotiabank lowered its price target on Verizon from $51.50 to $50.00 following the announcement.
• Ex-Dividend Factor: Friday also marked Verizon's ex-dividend date for its upcoming $0.71 per share quarterly payout, which accounts for a small portion of the mechanical stock price adjustment.

The question for Verizon (VZ) is whether the FCC's October 8 decision signals a future in which Verizon's traditional terrestrial wireless network becomes less central to the business, as drones, satellites, and hybrid networks take over some connectivity functions. Competitive threat: satellite operators and other nontraditional providers could capture services that historically required terrestrial cellular networks.
Verizon could sell the terrestrial connectivity, backhaul, spectrum access, network management, and hybrid services that drones and satellite operators still need. Network transformation: Verizon could need to change how it deploys capital, uses spectrum, and monetizes its existing network.The important distinction is whether the FCC is merely enabling new uses of communications technology or actually changing the regulatory and competitive economics of the wireless industry.
Verizon (VZ):has invested heavily in cellular spectrum, towers, fiber, and its wireless customer base. If satellite-enabled service becomes a credible alternative for ordinary phone users, Verizon could face more pricing pressure and a weaker competitive advantage from its network coverage.Verizon could participate in hybrid coverage, enterprise connectivity, and satellite partnerships. Its existing terrestrial infrastructure does not become worthless simply because satellites improve.AT&T has acquired additional spectrum to expand its terrestrial network. Its spectrum position and network assets could help it compete, but it faces the same risk of satellite-enabled alternatives changing wireless. T-Mobile (TMUS): Satellite connectivity could challenge the value of T-Mobile's coverage claims and its ability to win customers through competitive pricing. But a hybrid network could extend coverage and improve its offerings. The extent of the threat depends on service quality, pricing, and how quickly the technology scales.A satellite network cannot automatically replace cellular infrastructure everywhere. Capacity, indoor coverage, spectrum interference, latency, and the economics of serving dense urban areas remain important constraints.
The October 29 FCC meeting. The proposed agenda includes spectrum auction policy, modernization of direct-to-device satellite rules, and drone use of the 800 MHz cellular band. These could establish the regulatory direction for hybrid networks. SpaceX's actual business plan. Does it intend to partner with carriers, sell wholesale capacity, or compete directly for their subscribers? The last option poses the clearest threat to Verizon's core consumer business.
Verizon's response. Watch for changes in satellite partnerships, spectrum strategy, network investment plans, and management's explanation of how it will protect wireless revenue and margins.
Returns on existing network assets. If Verizon must keep spending heavily to defend its customers while satellite competitors avoid some conventional infrastructure costs, that could weaken future returns on invested capital.
This is a credible long-term competitive threat to the traditional telecom model, not proof that Verizon's network is about to become obsolete. The danger is that Verizon could retain its expensive infrastructure obligations while losing some pricing power and customer relationships to a more flexible competitor.For a Legacy VZ shareholder, I would distinguish a temporary stock-price shock from a permanent reduction in the value of Verizon's cash flows. The decisive evidence will be subscriber losses, pricing trends, margins, capital spending, and the actual cost and performance of Starlink's mobile service—not the FCC announcement alone.

Hearing of many resignations of key personnel fleeing to upstream competitors starting operations. Any truth to that? How is the company addressing? This is a complex place to operate and can’t afford to be losing talent like this.

SpaceX reached a deal to buy cellular spectrum licenses from investment firm Grain Management, its biggest move yet into a wireless market dominated by traditional telecom companies.

The U.S. licenses, which are in the 800-megahertz band, are tailored for wireless service from cellphone towers rather than satellites. The spectrum could serve SpaceX’s stated ambition of moving its Starlink satellite service beyond broadband into the wireless market to compete with the likes of AT&T & Verizon.

U.S. cellphone carrier stocks sank on the news. Shares in AT&T, Verizon and T-Mobile all fell more than 6% after the post-close announcement. SpaceX shares climbed about 3% to $165.10 after hours.

https://www.cnbc.com/2026/10/08/spacex-spectrum-license-att-verizon-tmobile.html

Stink and “Leadership” laughed at Starlink and said they weren’t a real threat. Look where we are now.

SpaceX is making moves to become a serious competitor in wireless, acquiring nationwide low-band spectrum that could help Starlink Mobile compete directly with AT&T, Verizon and T-Mobile. $T stock down 7.5% on the news.

And what the fu-k are we focused on? Badge swipes, 5x RTO and how many bowling alleys to put in Stinkey’s new corporate fantasy factory.

The industry is changing right in front of us, and leadership is worried about forcing people into an office instead of focusing on the competition, innovation and the future of this business.

We’re fighting employees over where they sit while competitors are fighting for the future of connectivity.

Get this loser Stinkey out before he does any more damage.

This is so savage. The amount of free press they are going to get from this by not having a mediocre marketing department is incredible. I’m switching. Source: my friend at Starlink.

Verizon, AT&T and T-Mobile stock just dropped 7% after-hours after
@SpaceX
announced that it has acquired spectrum licenses, bringing it closer to becoming a full-fledged mobile carrier in the U.S.

Starlink Mobile is about to change the game.

https://www.cnbc.com/2026/10/08/spacex-spectrum-license-att-verizon-tmobile.html

IBM faces existential pressure from structural irrelevance in the defining technologies of the era, chronic inability to convert scale into growth, and accelerating displacement of its core cash engines. While the company remains profitable today—with roughly $67–69 billion in annual revenue, solid free cash flow, and a durable installed base—the trajectory of its business model, competitive position, and technological relevance points toward progressive marginalization rather than long-term survival as a top-tier technology power.
Legacy Anchors That No Longer Generate Momentum
IBM’s most defensible assets are also its greatest liabilities. Mainframes and associated transaction-processing software still handle a large share of global financial transactions and core banking workloads. High switching costs create a moat: replacing decades of COBOL and specialized systems is risky and expensive. That installed base delivers recurring software revenue and cash, but it does not expand. Recent quarters have shown sharp declines in mainframe-related sales (infrastructure down 7% in one key period, with transaction processing particularly weak), even after launches positioned as AI-capable (such as the z17). Management has acknowledged that customers redirected capital expenditure toward servers, storage, and memory to secure supply amid AI-driven shortages and price pressures.
The problem is deeper than one quarter. AI tools are lowering the cost and risk of modernization. Automated code translation, agentic systems, and cloud-native alternatives make migration more feasible. Once customers move workloads off the mainframe, the associated high-margin software stack is also at risk. IBM has repeatedly stated that mainframe dollars pull through substantial software revenue; erosion of the former threatens the latter. A business whose primary defense is “it is dangerous to leave” rather than “it is advantageous to stay and expand” is not built for growth markets.
Persistent Failure to Capture Platform Shifts
IBM has a decades-long pattern of missing or under-participating in the major technology transitions that determine industry leadership. It was late and weak in personal computing, largely missed the initial public cloud wave, and has remained a minor player in infrastructure-as-a-service. Current cloud market data consistently places IBM in the low-single-digit share range (around 2%), far behind AWS (roughly 28–31%), Microsoft Azure (20–24%), and Google Cloud (12–15%). The top three control the large majority of the market and are growing faster in absolute terms, fueled by AI infrastructure demand.
Hybrid cloud and Red Hat (acquired at a high multiple) provide a more relevant offering for regulated enterprises that need on-premises and multi-cloud flexibility. Yet this has not translated into market-share gains or growth rates that close the gap with hyperscalers. Software now represents roughly 45% of revenue and is the stated growth engine, but organic growth has been uneven and recently decelerated. Acquisitions have bulked up the portfolio, yet they also add integration risk, higher debt, and the burden of justifying elevated purchase prices through accelerated expansion that has not consistently materialized.
In generative and agentic AI, IBM’s watsonx and Granite models emphasize governance, enterprise data, and hybrid deployment—sensible differentiators for regulated industries. However, the company has not established leadership in foundation models, training infrastructure, or the developer ecosystems that drive platform lock-in. Customers are spending heavily on AI capacity from NVIDIA-centric and hyperscaler stacks; IBM’s share of that incremental wallet is limited. Consulting engagements around AI exist, but evidence suggests some AI-related work displaces rather than expands traditional services revenue.
Structural and Cultural Handicaps
IBM remains a large, complex organization (hundreds of thousands of employees) operating across many countries and product lines. Speed and adaptability suffer under such scale. Recent profit warnings and guidance cuts explicitly cited failure to adapt quickly enough when customer spending patterns shifted and large deals slipped. Layoffs continue as the company attempts to reallocate toward higher-value software and AI, a recurring theme rather than a one-time reset.
Debt levels elevated by acquisitions constrain strategic flexibility. Quantum computing is frequently cited as a long-term opportunity, yet commercial scale remains years away (fault-tolerant systems targeted later in the decade), and current contract value is modest relative to overall revenue. Betting the narrative on a technology that is still pre-commercial while core businesses face pressure is high-risk.
Competition is multi-front and intense: hyperscalers in cloud and AI platforms, specialized software vendors in data and automation, pure-play consultants (Accenture and others) in services, and nimble AI-native firms that can iterate faster. IBM’s integrated stack (technology + consulting + research) is marketed as a strength, yet integration has not produced superior growth or share gains against more focused competitors.
Financial Reality Versus Narrative
Revenue growth has been low-to-mid single digits in most recent years, with occasional better quarters followed by slowdowns. Profitability and free cash flow remain respectable, supporting a dividend and buybacks, but the market has repeatedly punished misses and lowered guidance. Valuation multiples have compressed relative to growth peers. A company that generates cash from a shrinking or stagnant core while struggling to build new high-growth engines is on a path of gradual relative decline. Survival in the absolute sense (continuing as a going concern) is plausible for years due to the mainframe annuity and enterprise relationships. Survival as a relevant, competitive technology leader capable of attracting talent, capital, and the next generation of workloads is far less assured.
The historical pattern is consistent: IBM identifies the right themes (hybrid cloud, AI, quantum), invests and acquires, yet fails to achieve the scale, speed, or product superiority needed to redefine its trajectory. In an industry defined by platform power, network effects, and rapid iteration, that pattern is terminal for leadership. The installed base buys time; it does not buy a future. Without a decisive break from low-growth legacy dependence and a demonstrated ability to win in the platforms that matter, IBM’s long-term survival as more than a cash-yielding utility for aging enterprise systems is improbable.

i honestly think part of the proble is our executives just aren't as good as the people running some of these other car companies. look at toyota &honda. people keep buying them because they are reliable and they give customers what they want. now you have the rav4 passing the f150 and that should be a pretty big wake up call. the f150 has been one of the biggest things ford has going for it for years.

then look at the edge. ford got rid of it and maybe the edge had problems and maybe sales weren't great, but meanwhile toyota keeps selling the rav4 like crazy. korean companies are doing well too. so somehow everybody else keeps figuring out what people want while we keep changing plans. we used to benchmark toyota and honda all the time. from what i remember we would look at a few things they were doing, copy a piece of it, and then go right back to doing things the ford way. we never really changed the whole system. that is what bothers me.

toyota is not doing magic. honda is not doing magic. they just seem to make better decisions over a long period of time. at ford we cancel products, start new programs, reorganize, change priorities, bring in new leadership ideas, talk about software, evs, subscriptions and whatever the new thing is. then a couple years later the direction changes again. and when something doesn't work the explanation is always complicated. regulations. interest rates. china. labor. dealers. suppliers.

customers didn't understand the product. whatever. at some point maybe the answer is simpler. maybe the people making the big decisions at toyota and honda are just better at their jobs. you can make fun of toyota all you want, but customers keep walking into their dealerships and buying their vehicles. that is the scoreboard that matters.

Ahead of next week’s board meeting let’s revisit the 1 year returns for PSX and their peers:

PSX: +108%
VLO: +150%
MPC: +166%
PBF: +209%

How’s the job market there with tech booming. It is possible there is too much competition too, but just wondering if anyone has landed jobs there after moving away from T

https://tech-insider.org/intel-amd-stock-slide-nvidia-n1x-pc-chip-2026/

Changing IBM’s CEO alone will not fix its underlying product problem: customers need compelling reasons to choose—and keep paying for—its technology. Recent acquisition Hashicoprp Terraform faces OpenTofu, and IBM’s software must justify its additional cost against cloud-native alternatives. In my view, IBM Bob’s enterprise proposition pales beside Claude Code using Claude models through Amazon Bedrock, supplemented by Martin AI for easier token budgeting, prompt and plugin libraries, and usage leaderboards. That combination addresses both developer productivity and enterprise adoption; Bob must demonstrate a compelling advantage beyond access to models that IBM itself sources from providers such as Anthropic. A leadership change cannot substitute for differentiated products and clear customer value. The board should seriously explore selling IBM while its enterprise relationships and established assets still command substantial value, rather than asking shareholders to finance another turnaround promise.

I have trainings due at the end of October and some halfway through November’s. My people leader is requesting to have them all done by end of this week. What is the rush? Why am I getting “urgent” emails for something that’s due a month from now. Is there internal competition between the markets on who get is done. I don’t understand why push unless there was some incentive that employees aren’t aware about

Can someone tell me how running the same playbook that ran us into the ground around walking out of wholesale (aka in china this is a distributor model bc of mono brand retail) in the MOST RELATIONSHIP DRIVEN COUNTRY ON THE PLANET is a good idea?

Who signed off on this? Who believes the investment in own retail over partner doors a success for us so doing it now will help us?

All that will happen is those storefronts will change to competitor brands and we will lose not shelf space but PRIME RETAIL LOCATIONS,

Good god help us all.

I'm fairly new to Dell but one thing I've noticed right off the bat is just how far behind we are with our enterprise software solutions. Why is that? We literally have thousands and thousands (we used to anyway) of software engineers yet none of our solutions are really taken seriously in the market. In fact, some of our solutions get laughed at or thrown out like PowerStore or PPDM.

You'd think that as one of the largest IT companies in the industry, we could develop software solutions that were competitive with other vendors to help sell complete turnkey offerings to our customers. But all our customers seem to want is cheap hardware. They go elsewhere for their software solutions. And that's where all the margins are.

Now that Verizon is no longer trying to compete in the wireless business, competition is heating up in the fiber business. Are we ready or will there be more layoffs from this?

September 8, 2026 11:11 AM EDT
Verizon signs optical fiber deal with Corning to expand broadband
https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/verizon-signs-optical-fiber-deal-with-corning-expand-broadband-support-ai-growth-2026-09-08/

September 29, 2026 9:30 AM EDT
AT&T signs over $3 billion fiber deal with Corning as data demand surges
https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/att-signs-over-3-billion-fiber-deal-with-corning-data-demand-surges-2026-09-29/

Are we even trying to get Verizon's name on the list so customers will see it if they are considering which service is the best?

Or is Verizon wireless to be left on the side of the road to give more attention and dollars to AI data centers?

The Opensignal Annual Global 5G Awards 2026 highlight the top-performing mobile network operators worldwide based on real-world data across large and small land-area markets.

And I can't find Verizon's name in there anywhere.

Large Land-Area Markets
5G Coverage Experience: T-Mobile (USA)
5G Download Speed: Vivo (Brazil)
5G Games Experience: Telekom (Germany)
5G Reliability: au (Japan) and SoftBank (Japan)
5G Voice App Experience: au (Japan)
Time on 5G: T-Mobile (USA)
5G Video Experience: Tied among 12 operators (Elisa and DNA in Finland; T-Mobile, Orange, and Play in Poland; Tele2, 3, and Telenor in Sweden; Telenor, ice, and Telia in Norway; Telia in Finland)

Small Land-Area Markets
5G Coverage Experience: Singtel (Singapore)
5G Download Speed: SK Telecom (South Korea)
5G Games Experience: Swisscom (Switzerland)
5G Reliability: Telenor (Denmark), Norlys (Denmark), A1 (Austria), and A1 (Slovenia)
5G Video Experience: Odido (Netherlands)
5G Voice App Experience: KT (South Korea)
Time on 5G: StarHub (Singapore)

BASF is reportedly in exploratory negotiations to acquire Evonik, another major German chemical company. This potential merger comes as both companies face challenges in the cosmetics and personal care raw materials sector, with slowing growth and increased competition. The deal could significantly reshape the global beauty and personal care ingredient market if it proceeds. Both companies have complementary strengths, with BASF offering scale and a broad product line, while Evonik excels in specialty chemicals and high-end additives. The move may signal a broader trend of consolidation in the upstream beauty industry as companies seek to navigate market pressures.

https://eu.36kr.com/en/p/4003124352667784

Ahead of Alphabet, Amazon, Nvidia, and all our competitors: https://fortune.com/ranking/aiq/

Honestly surprised by this

"Hester Peirce, a Commissioner on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission speaks at the 2025 Bretton Woods Committee Spring Summit. (Photo by Kayla Bartkowski/Getty Images)
Raymond James said that the stock is appropriately valued given the company's "significant deceleration" in organic growth. The firm said it lacks confidence that Fiserv’s near-term headwinds in its Financial Services and Clover units are temporary, citing increased competition."

• Raymond James downgrades the stock to ‘market perform’ from ‘outperform’ on Thursday
• Stocktwits sentiment slipped to ‘bearish’ from ‘bullish’ three months ago.
• Stock down 17% this year

https://stocktwits.com/news-articles/markets/equity/fiserv-heads-for-third-month-in-red-analyst-says-stock-appropriately-valued/cZ3uwjqRIlo

There's been a lot of anger and frustration directed at leadership lately, and given everything that's changing, that's completely understandable. But I wanted to step back from the noise for a moment and look at where we actually stand, soberly and with the numbers in front of us.

Let's start with the basics: we're a company that makes a lot of money. In 2025, we generated $124 billion in revenue, $36 billion in EBITDA, and $20 billion in net income. Our balance sheet carries about $90 billion in net debt — a large number in isolation, but very manageable set against our revenue and profitability.

So why is our stock falling, and why does it feel like every quarter brings another round of cost cuts?

The answer isn't in where we are today. It's in where the business is headed. I'll set NBCUniversal aside for this and focus on our Connectivity business, since that's the bulk of our revenue. Let's go through it line by line.

Broadband brought in $26 billion last year — 20% of our total revenue. It's declining, and faster than most of us expected. We lost 650,000 of our 29 million subscribers, and to slow that decline, we've had to lower prices across the board: average price per customer fell 3.8% last quarter alone. To put that in perspective, a 3.8% price drop on $26 billion is roughly $1 billion in lost revenue — and lost profit — from pricing alone. Add the subscriber losses, and that's another half a billion. The uncomfortable truth is that the driver here isn't primarily service quality, even though that plays a role — it's competition. We used to compete against DSL as our main rival. Today we're being overbuilt almost everywhere, by fiber, by fixed wireless, and soon by satellite too. If that trend continues, and there's every reason to think it will, we're looking at millions more subscribers lost in the years ahead.

Cable TV is still a cash cow, also generating around $26 billion in revenue in 2025. But our subscriber base has fallen from 25 million to 10 million over the past decade-plus. This is structural, not cyclical, decline. The only reason revenue has held up this well is a combination of steady price increases and our success at retaining higher-value customers. But make no mistake: the decline here is terminal. This business will eventually disappear — what we're managing is the pace of that decline, not whether it happens. Our advertising revenue, another $4 billion, moves down right alongside it.

Landline voice is something many of us already think of as "dead," but it's still about $3 billion in revenue, and it's shrinking roughly 20% a year.

Comcast Business brings in $10 billion. The problem here is that our SMB segment faces the exact same competitive pressure as residential, and we're losing customers at an accelerating pace as fiber and fixed wireless take share. Enterprise can still grow, but at meaningfully lower margins — it's a far more labor-intensive business, and enterprise customers expect deeper discounts.

Wireless brings in about $5 billion — $1.3 billion in equipment, $3.6 billion in service. Once you account for phone subsidies to win new customers, churn, operating costs, and the fees we pay our MVNO partner, this is a thin-margin business. It can absolutely keep growing, but how much profit it can actually generate is a real question — and the growth ceiling is capped by our broadband base. As broadband shrinks, so does the ceiling for wireless.

Putting it all together, here's how I'd forecast each piece going forward:

Broadband: $26B, declining ~5% a year
TV: $26B, declining ~10% a year
Advertising: $4B, declining ~10% a year
Landline Voice: $3B, declining ~20% a year
Comcast Business: $10B, flat at best
Wireless: $5B, growing ~15% a year

(There's also roughly $5 billion in international connectivity — that's Sky, and it moves over to NBCUniversal as part of the separation.)

Here's the part that makes this especially painful: our margin structure. When we lose a broadband subscriber, our costs barely move — nearly all of our cost base is fixed. The contribution margin on the last customer we add, or lose, is over 90%. That means when a customer leaves, profit falls almost as much as revenue does.

So here's where that leaves us: a business that's declining quickly, with margins shrinking just as fast. Cutting overhead and discretionary spend is the lever we have in the near term to protect the business — but let's be clear-eyed about it: that lever doesn't fix the underlying problem. It just buys us time.

Hey Verizon!!! Are you having a good day? I hope you are having a good day. T-Mobile is having a great day!!!

T-Mobile scores another 5G first, and customers are already reaping the benefits
https://www.phonearena.com/news/t-mobile-5g-sa-roaming_id183512

I have a friend that works on the machines that told me he was told to work on a Coke fountain dispenser. Apparently the store owns the machine but pours Coke and hires Pepsi to fix it. When I started as a driver we would have been walked off the property if we were caught with competition product in our car. No wonder this company is losing.