#performance

Here's how I see the next two years playing out.

It starts with a Q4 earnings miss. The stock drops. Then the data center timelines slip, and it drops again. Neither hit is fatal on its own, but together they shake the confidence the whole story depends on.

Meanwhile, the layoffs don't stop. They won't come as one big announcement. They'll keep arriving quietly, team by team, the surgical cuts we've already been watching.

The reorg is where the real damage shows. The new structure won't hold, and it will break hardest in the old GIUs that now report into different leaders and serve different priorities. Those units ran on deep domain knowledge and their own way of working. Pull that apart, and the industry-specific products start to stall. Some won't just slow down. They'll fall off a cliff and go into negative growth.

None of this shows up in the numbers right away. Strategy decisions take time to work through a company this size. By Q4 2027, though, the consequences will be impossible to ignore, and that's when the stock craters.

By 2028, Oracle is in full recovery mode. I am voting with my checkbook and accumulating stock right now - I've been known to make grave investment mistakes and read this with a dose of caution.

But when will we, regular employees, see any benefit from it?

https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/citi-profit-jumps-40-with-higher-investment-banking-services-wealth-revenue-2026-10-13/

I’m interested in someone that understands the fundamentals of our business, not Charlie su-ks.

Why does the bank keep missing targets? How does non interest income fall $1b year over year?

It seems we are incurring higher expenses for CIB but continue to fail to reap commiserate revenue and income benefits.

I don't. All the people I know who were laid off are seasoned workers with plenty of institutional knowledge and a track record of high performance. It's like leadership is sabotaging the company by cutting the best and leaving the worst behind. It makes no sense.

Looks like it's still broken. Lots of negative accelerators for teams that are exempt from negative accelerators. Missing orders, broken backlog.

When do they seize JC's bonus for this catastrophy?

There are only so many hours in a day, and my workload stopped being realistic a long time ago. I'm covering responsibilities that used to belong to multiple people, so some deadlines are inevitably going to slip. I'm not going to pretend otherwise by working myself into the ground. If everything needs to be done faster, the staffing needs to match the workload.

Designed to be the enabler and bring more deals to the much more capable sales staff. The sales staff that got overlooked for the CE roles are the hunters. Now we have Client executives getting involved in all deals. I’ve personally witnessed CEs making deals smaller to show they add value. It’s a terrible sales play… CEs are managed by a sales leader and SSE is managed by another sales manager. Managers of managers! No one is able to hit the road sales plans are a priority!
. It’s a joke isn’t it nearly Q3 already ? Agree ?

How do members of the executive “senior leadership” team justify collecting millions of dollars in compensation, bonuses, and RSUs while presiding over the destruction of shareholder value?

At what point does executive compensation become disconnected from actual performance and results?

Employees and shareholders are expected to absorb the consequences of poor performance, yet those at the very top continue to be rewarded handsomely. Where is the accountability? Where is the Board's oversight?

Leadership isn't measured by titles, compensation packages, or the number of RSUs awarded. It's measured by results, sound decisions, and the value created for shareholders. But look at all the promotions and musical chairs at the top. All kool-aid drinking.

If the stock continues to suffer while executive compensation remains extraordinary, perhaps it's time to ask whether leadership is being rewarded for performance - or simply for occupying the executive suite.

we need less expensive peacock vanity projects coming from our Strategy & Transformation and more actual transformation, otherwise stock will be down 50% very soon! a new visionary CEO is long overdue!

Why are the salaries so high in this department?
What value does this organization create?
Why is the salary range for an IT Business Management Leader posted with a range of $221,591- $270,834?
Why are so many of the "leaders" in IT S&S not based in Austin or Maplewood?
Isn't this the third time the ITBM (IT Finance) team has been build up?
All I see from them is spreadsheets with version control issues.

Matchbox movie is actually pretty good. Great family action movie that's fun to watch. Reminds me of the Jumanji movies with the Rock.

Hopefully it will help the bottom line

Share what your seeing with accelerated declines and well performance issues along with all the drama of musical chairs on the FPSO

What happens when you hire an ex Mars Candy Bar executive to the the TOP DOG of IT at the worlds largest HealthCare insurer? You see more and more system outages, security breaches, P1 global impact incidents, and more off shoring. AEP this year is going to be a disaster across all segments, E&I, Medicare, you name it. How is that little tu-d still working here and not only that now CEO of another segment?

From Doug McIntyre:
Ford’s Terrible Five-Year Stock Performance
While the S&P 500 soared and rival GM recovered, Ford kept finding new ways to stumble under CEO Jim Farley, and the reasons behind its five-year slide reveal a company struggling to hold its ground in almost every market it…

Ford stock fell 18% over five years while the S&P 500 gained 75% and GM rose 40%, with Jim Farley overseeing most of the decline.

Ford's Europe sales dropped 18% to 171,670 units, falling behind Chinese EV maker BYD, which surged 163% to over 177,000 registrations.

Ford's upcoming Fathom EV pickup launches on an unproven production platform a year from now, highlighting the company's slow model-to-market pace.

https://247wallst.com/investing/2026/10/09/fords-terrible-five-year-stock-performance/

I wasn’t planning on posting twice today, but some new numbers crossed the NoCenteam desk, and they definitely need to be discussed.

Bear with me, because I’m diving right in. We’ve already explored a few pieces of this story separately. The new information is what starts tying them together. And when you put the pieces next to each other, the picture isn’t pretty.

Centene recently reaffirmed adjusted EPS guidance above $4.80.[1] Great, that means Wall Street can unclench.

Now let's look at the other report card. CMS just released its 2027 Medicare Advantage Star Ratings, and seven Wellcare contracts landed at just 2.5 stars, covering more than 64,000 members across seven states.[2][3]

Oppenheimer says Centene's average ratings fell 9% year over year.[4] Meanwhile, Humana says approximately 95% of its Medicare Advantage members are now in plans rated four stars or higher, up from just 20% for 2026.[5] Same CMS. Same rating year. So spare us the excuses about the environment being difficult.

Centene paid $17.3 BILLION for WellCare.[6] Now it's cutting roughly a third of its MA plans, bailing out of hundreds of counties, reorganizing the company, eliminating employees, shipping work to vendors, and betting harder on dual-eligible members.[7]

And somehow we're supposed to applaud because EPS is holding up? That's the fu--ing point. The financial numbers can look better because you cut things. Let’s discuss what was cut:

People.
Markets.
Products.
Overhead.
Internal expertise.

Quality doesn't work that way. You don't lay off your way to better care coordination. You don't outsource your way to institutional knowledge. And you sure as he-l don't get four stars because somebody found another few hundred million dollars of "efficiency."

These ratings also aren't some meaningless Consumer Reports sticker. They affect 2028 Medicare Advantage quality bonus payments.[2]

Four stars matters.

2.5 stars matters too. Just not in the way SLT would like.

And remember what Centene keeps selling investors: get Medicare Advantage back toward break-even in 2027 while focusing more heavily on D-SNPs.[7]

In other words, take on more members with complex needs while simultaneously squeezing the operation hard enough to repair the economics.

What could possibly go wrong?

Industry-leading health outcomes with an industry-leading cost structure.

How about we nail the health outcomes part before taking a victory lap on the cost structure?

Centene reports earnings October 27.[8]

Wall Street will undoubtedly ask about EPS, margins, Medicaid rates, and the MA turnaround.

Here's a free question:

If the Medicare Advantage turnaround is actually working, why did the newest quality report card get worse?

You can cut your way to an EPS target. You can’t cut your way to four stars.

Sources

[1] Centene SEC filing, Sept. 16, 2026 — 2026 adjusted EPS guidance reaffirmed above $4.80:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1071739/000107173926000172/cnc-20260916.htm

[2] CMS, 2027 Medicare Advantage and Part D Star Ratings, Oct. 8, 2026:
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/2027-medicare-advantage-part-d-star-ratings

[3] Becker's Payer Issues, Medicare Advantage contracts rated 2.5 stars or lower, Oct. 9, 2026:
https://www.beckerspayer.com/payer/medicare-advantage/medicare-advantage-plans-with-2-5-stars-or-lower-in-2027/

[4] Reuters, Oct. 8, 2026 — Oppenheimer analysis of 2027 Star Ratings, including Centene's year-over-year decline:
https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/cms-says-71-medicare-advantage-prescription-dr-g-enrollees-4-star-or-higher-2026-10-08/

[5] Reuters, Oct. 9, 2026 — Humana reports approximately 95% of MA membership in four-star-or-better plans for 2027 versus 20% for 2026:
https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/humana-surges-after-emerging-top-beneficiary-2027-medicare-star-ratings-2026-10-09/

[6] Centene, WellCare acquisition announcement — transaction valued at approximately $17.3 billion:
https://investors.centene.com/2020-01-23-Centene-Completes-Acquisition-of-WellCare

[7] Centene/Wellcare, 2027 Medicare Advantage offerings, Oct. 1, 2026:
https://investors.centene.com/2026-10-01-Wellcare-Unveils-2027-Medicare-Offerings-Focused-on-Affordability-and-Integrated-Care

[8] Centene Investor Relations — Q3 2026 earnings scheduled for Oct. 27:
https://investors.centene.com/

Stock down 10% and we are where we were last year before Nov layoffs

Oracle stock suffers accordingly (hit upper 130s yesterday).

How much more evidence do you need that Larry sc--wed the pooch on his AI deal and Oracle's finances? Open AI is a dog.

WRONG ON EVERY BIG CALL: THE RAMON RECORD

Forget personality. Judge the decisions.

CALL #1: Keep and integrate bottling.
Dec 2025: refranchising "not under consideration."
Oct 2026: "open to revisiting every option."
Result: 10 months to reverse his own flagship strategy.

CALL #2: We can win in soda.
Dr Pepper passed Pepsi as the #2 US soda.
Oct 2026, his words: "We are not competing well in soft drinks."

CALL #3: Integration will expand margins.
PBNA reported operating margin: 9.4% → 8.3% → 3.9% (2023-2025).
Q3 2026 core margin went DOWN, not up.

CALL #4: Our guidance is credible.
Cut in April 2025. Cut again October 2026.

CALL #5: The strategy creates shareholder value.
Total return since he took over (Oct 2018 to Oct 2026):
PepsiCo +53%. Coca-Cola +144%. S&P 500 +199%.
Stock: $196 peak (2023) → $128 now. Lowest close since 2020 this week.

WHO PAID FOR IT:
~$6B in restructuring charges, about half severance. Plants closed. 20% of SKUs cut. More cuts coming.
Frontline jobs absorbed the misses. Leadership didn't.

Five big calls. Five reversals or misses. Seven years.
At what point does "not satisfied with the performance" apply to the person running it?

If they want to cover for the laid-off people, at least provide better speed ram rom computers, and speed applications, what the fu-k is this need to wait 5 seconds to load to next page in internal portals and systems.

Teradud stock actually made it slightly over 30! What a performance!

Of course Snowflakes was up 10.55 to 343.40. That was based on this:

JPM sees software rally extending, favors Microsoft, ServiceNow, Snowflake

If you are at the point where you are like “f this”, could you please ask how FIFA performed and impacted sales in the US.

I’ll get my popcorn.

These North America numbers are terrible as expected. How long can leadership be able to stay while we have no growth in our top market? Ramon gold CNBC the company will cut costs to pay for innovation and marketing investments. Maybe he should start at the top this time.

TIAA created a governance program to safeguard the retirement products it manages for millions of Americans. Two Black women designed and ran it. According to a federal lawsuit filed September 24, 2026, both were pushed out within four months - and the work kept going without them.

The complaint, lodged in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleges TIAA terminated the worker who operated the program under a rationale its own internal communications contradicted the very next day.

The worker joined TIAA in August 2023 after two years at J.P. Morgan, according to the filing. She was recruited by a colleague - a Black female Managing Director hired in 2022 to create the company's New Business Initiative Assessment program, known internally as NBIA. Together, the two-person team developed the entire framework: an enterprise-wide governance and control system designed to ensure regulatory compliance and operational readiness for all new and materially modified products offered to TIAA's retirement and wealth management clients.

The program was no back-office exercise. According to the complaint, TIAA's executive committee approved it, internal audit cleared it in the first quarter of 2025, and the company formally submitted it to the New York Department of Financial Services as a "key mitigant" for product safety and soundness risk. The pipeline grew from 22 initiatives in 2022 to 57 by mid-2025, the filing states, supporting business lines projected to bring in over $25 billion in additional assets.

Over 31 months, the worker received no documented performance criticism of any kind, according to the filing. No improvement plan. No discipline. No warning.

Then her colleague went on approved medical leave in late July 2025.

The complaint alleges that a senior manager - who the filing says had "no knowledge of the area" - immediately tried to pressure the worker into gutting the program without the colleague's knowledge. On the first night of the leave, he emailed her: "we will need your leadership to determine, practically speaking, which activities to curtail or eliminate," according to the filing. The worker refused, citing the program's regulatory importance, and added her colleague to the email chain so she would see it on her return.

Within weeks, a covering manager was installed while the worker was on approved leave. According to the complaint, this manager - who is not Black - launched what the filing describes as "a sustained campaign" to disparage the NBIA program as "confusing" and "duplicative." The complaint alleges the covering manager badgered the worker in meetings, excluded her from others, portrayed her as dishonest in writing before senior colleagues, and pressured her to alter approved committee minutes that had been reviewed by TIAA's legal department.

The worker refused to change the minutes.

The complaint alleges the worker raised concerns to TIAA's HR business partner on multiple occasions between August and September 2025. According to the filing, HR took no corrective action. Instead, the complaint states, the HRBP sent the worker a lengthy written reprimand for raising those concerns and instructed her to trust in the covering manager's "positive intent."

The worker's response, according to the filing, was pointed: she asked what outlets were available to speak up "if HR no longer feels able to listen."

According to the complaint, the HRBP dismissed her concerns entirely, writing that senior leaders were being asked to "break bureaucracy" by streamlining processes and driving efficiencies.

The colleague returned from leave in October 2025. One month later, on November 17, 2025, she was terminated, the filing states. The publicly stated rationale was eliminating "duplicative" processes - offered, the complaint alleges, without documentary support and contradicting the program's own institutional history: a program TIAA had created to fill a governance gap, approved by its own executive committee, submitted to regulators, and cleared by internal audit only months earlier.

The worker learned of the termination by phone while she was overseas on approved leave, according to the complaint. The covering manager told her to stop communicating with the terminated colleague about anything TIAA-related - even though the colleague's official employment did not end until January 2, 2026, the filing states.

From there, the complaint alleges the treatment intensified.

The covering manager demanded a list of every stakeholder meeting the worker held, a demand the complaint alleges was not made of any similarly situated employee. In early December, the covering manager verbally requested a report needed for a December 10 meeting, according to the filing. The worker delivered it on December 9. The covering manager reprimanded her in writing for not having it by December 8 - a deadline the complaint states was never communicated and fell during a period of approved leave.

Then came the vacation cap.

In January 2026, the covering manager informed the worker for the first time that she should "baseline" at approximately 20 days of annual vacation, the complaint states. That cap did not exist. According to the filing, the worker's offer at hire included unlimited paid time off under TIAA's written "Responsible Time Off" policy, which contained no maximum. When the worker asked for the policy basis, the covering manager sent a screenshot showing a 20-hour New York Paid Prenatal Leave entitlement - a provision the filing describes as bearing no relationship to the worker's circumstances and concerning hours rather than days.

In the same exchange, the complaint states, the covering manager attached a report of the worker's complete time-off history going back to 2024, before her management even began, signaling that past use of an unlimited benefit was now under retroactive scrutiny.

Then came the performance review.

In January 2026 - weeks before the only negative review of her tenure - the covering manager's own chief of staff sent the worker formal written recognition. According to the complaint, he praised "the clarity and depth of her presentation as truly outstanding" and described her "leadership and subject matter expertise as invaluable assets."

On January 29, 2026, the covering manager delivered the year-end review over video call, the complaint states. She read the colleague's overwhelmingly positive feedback aloud, then mentioned she had added her own written comments and told the worker to read them after the call. The negative portion was based on approximately three weeks of actual observation, according to the filing. The electronic sign-off deadline was the next day. The worker submitted a written rebuttal. When she asked for examples to support the claims, the covering manager could not provide any, according to the complaint.

On February 3, 2026, the worker attended a company-sponsored, invitation-only Black History Month event at NASDAQ organized by a TIAA business resource group, the filing states. While she was at the event, a "time sensitive" report was demanded with a same-day deadline. The covering manager then reprimanded the worker in writing - copying a colleague - and instructed her to report her whereabouts when away from her desk, according to the complaint.

On March 26, 2026, TIAA told the worker her role was being eliminated. The rationale: NBIA processes would be "integrated" into strategic governance functions. The next day, according to the filing, the covering manager sent an email to a broad internal audience instructing staff to continue performing the same NBIA work, using the same process and tools. She asked recipients who had previously met with the worker to redirect their questions to another employee - one the complaint describes as having no working knowledge of the NBIA program.

Also on that final working day, the complaint states, the worker received a request through the NBIA management tool to reactivate an initiative the covering manager had previously ordered placed in the "dead folder." The filing describes this as an attempt to avoid admitting the worker had been right to keep it in the pipeline.

At termination, the worker's base salary was $147,900, according to the complaint. She had also received $43,500 in incentive compensation the previous month.

The lawsuit brings claims of race and s-x discrimination under federal, state, and city law, along with claims of retaliation for raising discrimination complaints and for whistleblowing. The worker alleges she was punished for refusing to dismantle a regulatory control program and for flagging concerns about how she was being treated. She seeks compensatory and punitive damages, back and front pay, and attorneys' fees.

Her former colleague has filed a separate action against TIAA in the same court, the complaint states.

GTMO Ops Band 5 check-in. Currently at $84k base with a minimal $2k bonus. Feels low for the workload and AVP title on the internal track, but wanted to check reality. What are other Ops Consultants / Specialists seeing for total comp right now?

Train performance is in the tank.
238 late
61 on time
62 early.

Sure as heck isn’t anybody in the c-suite, their too busy planning what to do with their millions from the merger.

IBM faces existential pressure from structural irrelevance in the defining technologies of the era, chronic inability to convert scale into growth, and accelerating displacement of its core cash engines. While the company remains profitable today—with roughly $67–69 billion in annual revenue, solid free cash flow, and a durable installed base—the trajectory of its business model, competitive position, and technological relevance points toward progressive marginalization rather than long-term survival as a top-tier technology power.
Legacy Anchors That No Longer Generate Momentum
IBM’s most defensible assets are also its greatest liabilities. Mainframes and associated transaction-processing software still handle a large share of global financial transactions and core banking workloads. High switching costs create a moat: replacing decades of COBOL and specialized systems is risky and expensive. That installed base delivers recurring software revenue and cash, but it does not expand. Recent quarters have shown sharp declines in mainframe-related sales (infrastructure down 7% in one key period, with transaction processing particularly weak), even after launches positioned as AI-capable (such as the z17). Management has acknowledged that customers redirected capital expenditure toward servers, storage, and memory to secure supply amid AI-driven shortages and price pressures.
The problem is deeper than one quarter. AI tools are lowering the cost and risk of modernization. Automated code translation, agentic systems, and cloud-native alternatives make migration more feasible. Once customers move workloads off the mainframe, the associated high-margin software stack is also at risk. IBM has repeatedly stated that mainframe dollars pull through substantial software revenue; erosion of the former threatens the latter. A business whose primary defense is “it is dangerous to leave” rather than “it is advantageous to stay and expand” is not built for growth markets.
Persistent Failure to Capture Platform Shifts
IBM has a decades-long pattern of missing or under-participating in the major technology transitions that determine industry leadership. It was late and weak in personal computing, largely missed the initial public cloud wave, and has remained a minor player in infrastructure-as-a-service. Current cloud market data consistently places IBM in the low-single-digit share range (around 2%), far behind AWS (roughly 28–31%), Microsoft Azure (20–24%), and Google Cloud (12–15%). The top three control the large majority of the market and are growing faster in absolute terms, fueled by AI infrastructure demand.
Hybrid cloud and Red Hat (acquired at a high multiple) provide a more relevant offering for regulated enterprises that need on-premises and multi-cloud flexibility. Yet this has not translated into market-share gains or growth rates that close the gap with hyperscalers. Software now represents roughly 45% of revenue and is the stated growth engine, but organic growth has been uneven and recently decelerated. Acquisitions have bulked up the portfolio, yet they also add integration risk, higher debt, and the burden of justifying elevated purchase prices through accelerated expansion that has not consistently materialized.
In generative and agentic AI, IBM’s watsonx and Granite models emphasize governance, enterprise data, and hybrid deployment—sensible differentiators for regulated industries. However, the company has not established leadership in foundation models, training infrastructure, or the developer ecosystems that drive platform lock-in. Customers are spending heavily on AI capacity from NVIDIA-centric and hyperscaler stacks; IBM’s share of that incremental wallet is limited. Consulting engagements around AI exist, but evidence suggests some AI-related work displaces rather than expands traditional services revenue.
Structural and Cultural Handicaps
IBM remains a large, complex organization (hundreds of thousands of employees) operating across many countries and product lines. Speed and adaptability suffer under such scale. Recent profit warnings and guidance cuts explicitly cited failure to adapt quickly enough when customer spending patterns shifted and large deals slipped. Layoffs continue as the company attempts to reallocate toward higher-value software and AI, a recurring theme rather than a one-time reset.
Debt levels elevated by acquisitions constrain strategic flexibility. Quantum computing is frequently cited as a long-term opportunity, yet commercial scale remains years away (fault-tolerant systems targeted later in the decade), and current contract value is modest relative to overall revenue. Betting the narrative on a technology that is still pre-commercial while core businesses face pressure is high-risk.
Competition is multi-front and intense: hyperscalers in cloud and AI platforms, specialized software vendors in data and automation, pure-play consultants (Accenture and others) in services, and nimble AI-native firms that can iterate faster. IBM’s integrated stack (technology + consulting + research) is marketed as a strength, yet integration has not produced superior growth or share gains against more focused competitors.
Financial Reality Versus Narrative
Revenue growth has been low-to-mid single digits in most recent years, with occasional better quarters followed by slowdowns. Profitability and free cash flow remain respectable, supporting a dividend and buybacks, but the market has repeatedly punished misses and lowered guidance. Valuation multiples have compressed relative to growth peers. A company that generates cash from a shrinking or stagnant core while struggling to build new high-growth engines is on a path of gradual relative decline. Survival in the absolute sense (continuing as a going concern) is plausible for years due to the mainframe annuity and enterprise relationships. Survival as a relevant, competitive technology leader capable of attracting talent, capital, and the next generation of workloads is far less assured.
The historical pattern is consistent: IBM identifies the right themes (hybrid cloud, AI, quantum), invests and acquires, yet fails to achieve the scale, speed, or product superiority needed to redefine its trajectory. In an industry defined by platform power, network effects, and rapid iteration, that pattern is terminal for leadership. The installed base buys time; it does not buy a future. Without a decisive break from low-growth legacy dependence and a demonstrated ability to win in the platforms that matter, IBM’s long-term survival as more than a cash-yielding utility for aging enterprise systems is improbable.

Leadership keeps blaming policies like tariffs, and international issues like diesel, aluminum, and such prices.

Meanwhile, KO sells products for cheaper, and is performing well with share and stock.

The difference is not that consumers got more price sensitive. Did it hurt? Yes. But it's obviously not the main culprit.

Well, there at it again long-term associates are getting looked over again and now they’re changing raises on frim years of service but performance and they keep increasing the budgets so nobody can hit their numbers..

PM here. So many of the CW I work with don’t meet deadlines so why are they still here? Why do their managers end up getting laid off instead of them?

Classification Shift: "Performance" vs. "Reduction in Force"
When a company executes a formal Reduction in Force (RIF), standard severance protocols (often 1 to 9 months of base pay based on tenure, plus healthcare continuation) apply. However, recent legal challenges and employee reports highlight a shift toward using performance-based separations: 
Forced Calibration & PIP Opt-Outs: Under calibrated performance systems, a predetermined percentage of employees are placed into lower performance tiers. Workers are often offered a choice: enter a strict Performance Enhancement Plan (PEP) or voluntarily opt for a modest, immediate severance package. If an employee enters the PEP and fails, they are terminated for cause—yielding $0 in severance. 
Sidestepping Pension Milestones: Federal litigation filed against the company alleges that forcing older or long-tenured employees into low performance tiers allows the organization to terminate workers shortly before reaching major pension or benefit vesting milestones, eliminating both severance and long-term benefit liabilities.

SCORE is still not right from Q2, do not know my back log from q2 that carried over.
Don't know where we are in Q3 either

Cromwell Long Short is the hedge fund MoA announced with some fanfare but has barely mentioned since. After raising $100 million in 2024, the fund has lagged its benchmark by about 12.5%. MoA waived fees every year — first 40 bps, then 190 bps—so the numbers are inflated. The firm has now started charging a lower 170 bps fee.

That $100 million was the largest single account MoA has ever won and played a role in Rich becoming CEO. Even so, the client has pulled about $40 million over the two years, roughly a third of the original capital, despite 32% returns since inception. Those redemptions are the real reason the firm has gone quiet on the fund.

Cromwell Long Short is a quant fund or they use 3rd party quant model to get buys and sells. Supposedly MoA shares fees with the model provider. Results kind of speak for themselves.

Hey, Ai. what are the odds? ...fees remain a headwind. Gross expense ratios sit around 2.0–2.3%; the net/capped level is ~1.70% institutional / 1.95% investor after waivers (management fee is 1.40%). That is expensive for a strategy that delivers substantial equity beta.
Assets have stayed around $90–93 million. The earlier $100 million commitment and subsequent redemptions (roughly one-third of capital) signal limited conviction. Small AUM makes it harder to attract new capital or justify the resources.

Ahead of next week’s board meeting let’s revisit the 1 year returns for PSX and their peers:

PSX: +108%
VLO: +150%
MPC: +166%
PBF: +209%

They usually fire people for performance in Oct , anyone know the date ?

The same comments have been made on this site too:

https://www.foxnews.com/outkick-sports/nike-ceo-may-have-admitted-company-went-woke-stock-hits-12-year-low

Below is the stock performance for all you d-mbasses that believe in this poorly ran company.

5 year (-79%) $200 to $39
3 year (-23.8%)
1 year (-36.5%)

Company is no longer a Fortune 500

Do you remember that disastrous interview on CNBC about 2 years back, with the now former Starbucks CEO - Laxman Narasimhan. He was fired shortly after. Interview played a small part, but it's Starbuck's declining performance with him at the helm that drove the decision.

Apart from a short stint at Pepsi, he's worked at McKinsey his whole career. No surprise that the first company he actually got to run, went down the toilet under his watch.

Yet he remains on the Verizon Board of Directors. These are the people making decisions for this company. Highly qualified.

Listen there is not much to worry about when it comes to layoffs if you’re doing your job, and doing it well!
If you’re a bottom then yeah you’re probably on the chopping block of your fan has to do layoffs.

Not all but the majority bottoms are those who we all have to pick the slack up for anyways. Not saying there isn’t the exception to the rule here and there but it’s far and few between. Most employees in the bottom are there for a reason. For example the infamous IE we’ve seen in this thread who does nothing but TikTok’s all night, does what we need last minute causing pile ups … if you’re like this you can expect to be cut if they need to pinch numbers. Otherwise you guys are good

It is concerning that the situation remains such a mess even after all these months. Really Wonder who is accountable for overseeing the integrations and migration to ODW, as the current issues suggest a significant lack of planning and execution and fo-e

Providing employees with a stable and reliable platform to monitor and track their attainment should be a basic requirement. More importantly, the system should provide an accurate representation of each seller’s attainment. The ongoing issues are not only causing unnecessary frustration but also undermine employees’ ability to effectively track their performance.

This is a fundamental business requirement that should have been carefully considered and tested before implementation. The lack of proper planning, foresight, and execution and uncertain resolution time and poor communications is extremely disappointing, and there needs to be clear accountability for how this situation was allowed to persist for so long.

Poor mismanagement of the entire integration. Poor judgement as well!

And then layoffs begin, rinse and repeat. Eventually there will be no one competent to do the work and the bottom will fall out.