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Richard Baker is retail poison!

source: https://therobinreport.com/saks-global-another-trainwreck/

01.07.26: The Robin Report: Saks Global: Another Trainwreck by Mark Cohen

Saks Global is Richard Baker’s next and maybe his final retail failure. Lord & Taylor, The Hudson Bay Company in all its various iterations in Canada and Europe, and now the monstrosity he recently created by putting Saks Fifth Avenue, Saks Off Fifth, Neiman Marcus and Bergdorf Goodman together, teeters on bankruptcy. This recent disaster is the result of the company’s failure to make a required $100 million interest payment to lenders at year’s end.

Baker, as a real estate manipulator, gets high marks. As a retail leader and retail strategist, however, he has been an abject failure.

Baker Shadow Play

Baker suddenly appeared on the retail scene in 2006 when his real estate company, NRDC, bought Lord & Taylor from the newly branded Federated/Macy’s Corporation, which inherited L&T when it acquired May Company stores. Then, in 2008, Baker acquired control of The Hudson Bay Company following the untimely death of its majority shareholder. Three years later, in 2011, Baker’s HBC sold its Zeller’s stores in Canada to Target Corporation for $1.8 billion. Kudos to Baker, as most of the Zeller’s store locations were arguably worthless as hapless Target would soon find out.

When I was Director of Retail Studies at the Columbia Business School, I attended a student-led Retail and Luxury Goods Conference in 2012, keynoted by Baker. He gave a rambling off the cuff 40-minute presentation in which he regaled the 250 students and guests in the audience about how great it was to be rich; how he did little work at Wharton having surrounded himself with “good looking babes” eager to do his work; and how he had just “stolen” Lord & Taylor from Federated for $1.2 billion. Narcissism aside, he was likely correct in his view that Federated could not wait to unload L&T as an outlying May Company property. He went on to talk about how easy it was to master the art of merchandising based on his exposure to L&T’s business. Completely put off by this performance, I was unfortunately seated in a location that precluded me from leaving early.

Next in 2013, Baker acquired Saks Fifth Avenue and Saks Off Fifth stores in what might be described as another triumph of price over value. Saks’ management had failed to fully recognize the leverage it could have used on its own behalf based on its Fifth Avenue store’s real estate valuation. Baker, as a real estate manipulator, gets high marks. As a retail leader and retail strategist, however, he has been an abject failure. His stewardship of Lord & Taylor was pathetic.

In an effort to cut expenses, he attempted to rationalize back-of-the-house activities between Canada-based Bay stores and American-based L&T stores, which may have made sense to some clueless consultant but never worked in retail reality. He then came up with a scheme to downsize the L&T Fifth Avenue flagship and sold the building to that other paragon of business strategy, WeWork, eventually ki-ling the L&T brand.

Baker and The Bay

The disruption and ultimate liquidation of The Bay’s principal competitor in apparel, accessories and soft home, Sears Canada, should have resulted in a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity, but The Bay failed to capitalize on it.

Moving Saks Fifth Avenue stores into The Bay stores spaces in Canada and introducing Saks Off Fifth in Canada was another failed initiative. In fact, moving Saks Fifth Avenue into a cavernous “low-brow” Bay location on Queen Street adjacent to the Eaton Center in Toronto was an incredible misstep in and of itself. The physical space was available, but the luxury customer certainly wasn’t there.

Opening over a dozen Bay department stores in the Netherlands in 2017 was another bone-headed move. Baker did a complex deal with Germany-based Galeria Karstadt Kaufhof, securing retail space in the Netherlands, but again the customer just wasn’t there. Allegedly, Baker believed that since the Canadian Army liberated the Netherlands from the Na-is at the end of WWII, the Dutch would welcome a Canadian company with open arms. It didn’t happen. The Dutch Bay stores were all closed by 2019. The customers who might have remembered being liberated in 1945 were either dead or too old to patronize a Canadian-owned department store. Baker claimed he made money on this ridiculous foray, and he may very well have, but the Dutch paid a terrible price for this catastrophe.

Baker Business Model

In 2024, Baker set his sights on acquiring Sak’s principal competitor, Neiman Marcus/Bergdorf Goodman. The timing wasn’t great. There was the disappearance of luxury competitor Barney’s, and the Saks business at best treaded water. Also, Neiman Marcus/Bergdorf Goodman was struggling to put a challenging Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding behind it.

There was also the monetization of hbc.com and saks.com, which raised a considerable amount of money from a group of hapless investors. These investors did not realize how completely counterproductive this strategy would prove to be.

Along the way, Richard Baker has presided over a never-ending list of lead executives, many of whom barely lasted two years with the company. There was Tina Johnson, Jeff Sherman, Bonnie Brooks, Jerry Storch, and Helena Foulkes, among others. And then there was Marc Metrick, whose 30-year tenure with Saks has just come to an abrupt end. But maybe it was 30 years too long. Metrick was a planning executive at Saks who, in recent years, masqueraded as its lead merchant.

Debt Economics

The history of two weak and/or weakened retail companies merging and finding success is simply this: There is no history. Add to that the non-starter of two companies that essentially do business with the same customer and in many cases in the same geographic locations. But these hurdles didn’t stop Baker from consummating a debt-laden merger of two icons. And incomprehensibly, for well over a year, the company failed to pay many of Saks’ vendors either on time or in many cases at all. So, now both companies have just completed a poor 2025 in sales. And having been cut off from receiving fresh inventory by a cynical factor community, Saks Global just failed to make that $100 million year-end interest payment.

Baker in Bankruptcy

Maybe Baker will come up with a bundle of new cash. If business remains as poor as it has been, any new cash infusion would only be a stopgap measure. Alternatively, the company might come up with a prepackaged restructuring agreement with its creditors. Or it will surrender to a voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy proceeding.

I’m not a bankruptcy attorney, but having lived through Federated department store’s successful restructure, and an up close and personal experience with Bradlees stores eventual failed emergence from bankruptcy, I think the bell may soon toll for Saks Global.

If it files for Chapter 11 financial relief, creditors organize and line up based upon their preexisting credit agreements (or lack thereof). Secured creditors, typically the company’s lenders, rely on collateral rights while unsecured creditors, typically vendors and service providers, hope for some eventual relief through the bankruptcy process. All payables from the company, whether current or past due, are frozen.

In a bankruptcy, legal and financial restructuring professionals line up for a typically substantial fee opportunity. A new lender or a consortium of lenders emerges to provide Debtor in Possession funding to enable the company to stay upright while in bankruptcy. All vendors are asked to resume shipping based on the newly created surety of DIP financing.

But, lacking confidence that past due receivables will eventually be paid, many vendors resort to selling their company receivables to distressed debt (or vulture) investors for substantial discounted values. This, in my opinion, is a terrible flaw in the bankruptcy process in that unsecured vendors, who you would expect to have a stake in the company’s eventual successful emergence from bankruptcy, have now traded places with investors seeking a fast financial return.

Saks Global at Risk

If Sak’s Global were operating as a stable platform with a successful sales and margin track record, with capable senior leadership, a reliable operating strategy, and good relationships with its vendors and customers, there would be ample reason for the company to navigate through bankruptcy and emerge with new debt and a newly restructured balance sheet. But none of this appears to be the case. As 2026 unfolds to what will undoubtedly be a challenging year for all retailers, the prospects for Saks Global are truly grim. My sense is that many vendors long ago stopped shipping or have curtailed their support for Saks, Neiman Marcus and maybe even Bergdorf Goodman, and they are unlikely to get back on board after having been egregiously abused these past few years.

Many will find another retailer to serve their customers if they haven’t already done so or continue to build a direct-to-consumer model of their own. Why wouldn’t they? Who needs the sturm und drang of a failing retail partner who doesn’t pay its bills? If that happens, Saks Global is toast.


Richard Baker is retail poison!

source: https://therobinreport.com/saks-global-another-trainwreck/

01.07.26: The Robin Report: Saks Global: Another Trainwreck by Mark Cohen

Saks Global is Richard Baker’s next and maybe his final retail failure. Lord & Taylor, The Hudson Bay Company in all its various iterations in Canada and Europe, and now the monstrosity he recently created by putting Saks Fifth Avenue, Saks Off Fifth, Neiman Marcus and Bergdorf Goodman together, teeters on bankruptcy. This recent disaster is the result of the company’s failure to make a required $100 million interest payment to lenders at year’s end.

Baker, as a real estate manipulator, gets high marks. As a retail leader and retail strategist, however, he has been an abject failure.

Baker Shadow Play

Baker suddenly appeared on the retail scene in 2006 when his real estate company, NRDC, bought Lord & Taylor from the newly branded Federated/Macy’s Corporation, which inherited L&T when it acquired May Company stores. Then, in 2008, Baker acquired control of The Hudson Bay Company following the untimely death of its majority shareholder. Three years later, in 2011, Baker’s HBC sold its Zeller’s stores in Canada to Target Corporation for $1.8 billion. Kudos to Baker, as most of the Zeller’s store locations were arguably worthless as hapless Target would soon find out.

When I was Director of Retail Studies at the Columbia Business School, I attended a student-led Retail and Luxury Goods Conference in 2012, keynoted by Baker. He gave a rambling off the cuff 40-minute presentation in which he regaled the 250 students and guests in the audience about how great it was to be rich; how he did little work at Wharton having surrounded himself with “good looking babes” eager to do his work; and how he had just “stolen” Lord & Taylor from Federated for $1.2 billion. Narcissism aside, he was likely correct in his view that Federated could not wait to unload L&T as an outlying May Company property. He went on to talk about how easy it was to master the art of merchandising based on his exposure to L&T’s business. Completely put off by this performance, I was unfortunately seated in a location that precluded me from leaving early.

Next in 2013, Baker acquired Saks Fifth Avenue and Saks Off Fifth stores in what might be described as another triumph of price over value. Saks’ management had failed to fully recognize the leverage it could have used on its own behalf based on its Fifth Avenue store’s real estate valuation. Baker, as a real estate manipulator, gets high marks. As a retail leader and retail strategist, however, he has been an abject failure. His stewardship of Lord & Taylor was pathetic.

In an effort to cut expenses, he attempted to rationalize back-of-the-house activities between Canada-based Bay stores and American-based L&T stores, which may have made sense to some clueless consultant but never worked in retail reality. He then came up with a scheme to downsize the L&T Fifth Avenue flagship and sold the building to that other paragon of business strategy, WeWork, eventually ki-ling the L&T brand.

Baker and The Bay

The disruption and ultimate liquidation of The Bay’s principal competitor in apparel, accessories and soft home, Sears Canada, should have resulted in a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity, but The Bay failed to capitalize on it.

Moving Saks Fifth Avenue stores into The Bay stores spaces in Canada and introducing Saks Off Fifth in Canada was another failed initiative. In fact, moving Saks Fifth Avenue into a cavernous “low-brow” Bay location on Queen Street adjacent to the Eaton Center in Toronto was an incredible misstep in and of itself. The physical space was available, but the luxury customer certainly wasn’t there.

Opening over a dozen Bay department stores in the Netherlands in 2017 was another bone-headed move. Baker did a complex deal with Germany-based Galeria Karstadt Kaufhof, securing retail space in the Netherlands, but again the customer just wasn’t there. Allegedly, Baker believed that since the Canadian Army liberated the Netherlands from the Na-is at the end of WWII, the Dutch would welcome a Canadian company with open arms. It didn’t happen. The Dutch Bay stores were all closed by 2019. The customers who might have remembered being liberated in 1945 were either dead or too old to patronize a Canadian-owned department store. Baker claimed he made money on this ridiculous foray, and he may very well have, but the Dutch paid a terrible price for this catastrophe.

Baker Business Model

In 2024, Baker set his sights on acquiring Sak’s principal competitor, Neiman Marcus/Bergdorf Goodman. The timing wasn’t great. There was the disappearance of luxury competitor Barney’s, and the Saks business at best treaded water. Also, Neiman Marcus/Bergdorf Goodman was struggling to put a challenging Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding behind it.

There was also the monetization of hbc.com and saks.com, which raised a considerable amount of money from a group of hapless investors. These investors did not realize how completely counterproductive this strategy would prove to be.

Along the way, Richard Baker has presided over a never-ending list of lead executives, many of whom barely lasted two years with the company. There was Tina Johnson, Jeff Sherman, Bonnie Brooks, Jerry Storch, and Helena Foulkes, among others. And then there was Marc Metrick, whose 30-year tenure with Saks has just come to an abrupt end. But maybe it was 30 years too long. Metrick was a planning executive at Saks who, in recent years, masqueraded as its lead merchant.

Debt Economics

The history of two weak and/or weakened retail companies merging and finding success is simply this: There is no history. Add to that the non-starter of two companies that essentially do business with the same customer and in many cases in the same geographic locations. But these hurdles didn’t stop Baker from consummating a debt-laden merger of two icons. And incomprehensibly, for well over a year, the company failed to pay many of Saks’ vendors either on time or in many cases at all. So, now both companies have just completed a poor 2025 in sales. And having been cut off from receiving fresh inventory by a cynical factor community, Saks Global just failed to make that $100 million year-end interest payment.

Baker in Bankruptcy

Maybe Baker will come up with a bundle of new cash. If business remains as poor as it has been, any new cash infusion would only be a stopgap measure. Alternatively, the company might come up with a prepackaged restructuring agreement with its creditors. Or it will surrender to a voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy proceeding.

I’m not a bankruptcy attorney, but having lived through Federated department store’s successful restructure, and an up close and personal experience with Bradlees stores eventual failed emergence from bankruptcy, I think the bell may soon toll for Saks Global.

If it files for Chapter 11 financial relief, creditors organize and line up based upon their preexisting credit agreements (or lack thereof). Secured creditors, typically the company’s lenders, rely on collateral rights while unsecured creditors, typically vendors and service providers, hope for some eventual relief through the bankruptcy process. All payables from the company, whether current or past due, are frozen.

In a bankruptcy, legal and financial restructuring professionals line up for a typically substantial fee opportunity. A new lender or a consortium of lenders emerges to provide Debtor in Possession funding to enable the company to stay upright while in bankruptcy. All vendors are asked to resume shipping based on the newly created surety of DIP financing.

But, lacking confidence that past due receivables will eventually be paid, many vendors resort to selling their company receivables to distressed debt (or vulture) investors for substantial discounted values. This, in my opinion, is a terrible flaw in the bankruptcy process in that unsecured vendors, who you would expect to have a stake in the company’s eventual successful emergence from bankruptcy, have now traded places with investors seeking a fast financial return.

Saks Global at Risk

If Sak’s Global were operating as a stable platform with a successful sales and margin track record, with capable senior leadership, a reliable operating strategy, and good relationships with its vendors and customers, there would be ample reason for the company to navigate through bankruptcy and emerge with new debt and a newly restructured balance sheet. But none of this appears to be the case. As 2026 unfolds to what will undoubtedly be a challenging year for all retailers, the prospects for Saks Global are truly grim. My sense is that many vendors long ago stopped shipping or have curtailed their support for Saks, Neiman Marcus and maybe even Bergdorf Goodman, and they are unlikely to get back on board after having been egregiously abused these past few years.

Many will find another retailer to serve their customers if they haven’t already done so or continue to build a direct-to-consumer model of their own. Why wouldn’t they? Who needs the sturm und drang of a failing retail partner who doesn’t pay its bills? If that happens, Saks Global is toast.


New Updated Intelligence On Walmart Layoffs

We don’t expect large wholesale layoffs before EOY (Jan 31st). Q4 is going fine, holiday event went fine and previous layoffs achieved the expense reduction plan. Therefore, we think everyone can rest easy for awhile.

However, there’s a trifecta of conditions that create concerns for the May (and beyond) time frame:

Leadership is changing and focus from the CEO perspective will likely be to stop the project and dollar bleed from languishing projects and project now out of favor.

Tech leadership is in the target zone to change from service provider to business partner, and when that spotlight shines, discovery of money pit projects will surface. Many will be scrapped along with the tech staff on them.

Focus on evaluating AI efforts will continue and sone projects will be cancelled and new ones will appear. That could add to staff reductions.

Expect to see reorganization efforts to more closely align with business goals. Reorganized always create excess staff, so take that into account.

The next 6-8 weeks will prove to be consequential for those in peril of low performance and the typical calibration type meetings will displace those that are unpopular for one reason or another.

It’ll be May before actions are apparent on new leaders, new goals and new projects actual staffing.

We still think transportation, distribution centers and stores will fare fine in 2026. The risk is primarily in tech, we believe


The Draft Has Started

Oh, you thought they were going to choose the most capable and knowledgeable people? Not a chance. They’re picking the ones who excel at kissing up and delivering polished slide decks to upper management. These are the folks who coast by using the work and expertise of the very people the company isn’t keeping.

They’re selecting the “yes‑at‑all‑costs” crowd—people who are just trying to hang on until the back half of 2028. Some of them even said they couldn’t relocate because of their spouse or personal situation… yet suddenly they’re taking the job?

Honestly, I hope it blows up in their faces when the yes‑people eventually leave, and the company realizes they let go of the people who actually knew the work and kept things running. At that point, they won’t even be able to operate properly.


The new business strategy is to go out of business

From where I'm sitting, just relying on layoffs and nothing else to make the numbers look better is a plan to go out of business. The new CEO isn't solving problems, he's just accelerating the decline. Watching the company I once cared about fall apart like this isn't just frustrating, it's genuinely sad.


Our Responsibility & Commitment

No wonder CK sends out a 7pm email on OUR RESPONSIBILITY and COMMITMENT..
LOLzzz
Don’t Trump know the defense companies work for stockholders not the nation ?

https://www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2026/01/08/government-contractors-trump-stock-buybacks.html

https://dpa-international.com/politics/urn:newsml:dpa.com:20090101:260108-99-106399/


SAP 2026 AI strategy is to make Palantir successful not SAP customers

The layoffs and reorganizations are a distraction and targeted to ki-l the old SAP business streams and make way for the future - Palantir becoming the most important service provider in Europe with the help of SAP.

CK recently sent an email to everyone explaining why AI is the top priority and all 5 OKRs on the SAP leadership level have AI in them. What he failed to mention that SAP is diverting their internal resources away from the core businesses such as ERP to focus on the immediate demand from Plantir and the U.S. Department of Defense.

Palantir is already an SAP partner.
https://www.sap.com/partners/find/palantir.html

However, there was never a time when SAP doubled down its entire engineering effort to satisfy one single partner. I won't share each of the 5 OKRs publicly. But if you look into each OKR and their overlap with the requests from Palantir, you will be surprised. The entirety of Sovreign cloud features are to support the U.S. Department of Defense and its supplier base.

Joule is synonymous with the Palantir Artificial Intelligence Platform where SAP just builds features that Palantir needs. Like AIP, Joule is supposed to focus on a relatively user friendly GUI for AI agents with a focus on low code / no code. It is to be given access to all customer data and also private SAP employee data. Even the interface of Joule mirrors AIP and it has the action-driven logic and automation in the code structure.

In internal emails, CK asked for focus on some critical industries for Joule. It is the same list that Palantir advertises on their AIP website.
https://www.palantir.com/platforms/aip/

In 2026 Q1 several employees in the top management will 'quit' because of the change in direction for the 2026 strategy. Signavio Process Mining is actually developing features that can be sued by Palantir's Foundry Process Mining & Automation platform.

I understand why a company would shift focus on AI features. But I don't understand why SAP is changing their entire strategy to accommodate for everything asked by a single SAP partner - Palantir. Seamless connectivity between Palantir and SAP Business Data Cloud was the first step. And now the executive board's decision is that the development in 2026 and 2027 will effectively ensure interoperability between Joule and AIP and allow for effective bidirectional data access.

Palantir is unable to get adequate access to European government, industry and civilian data and they plan to get this access through SAP. For this, Palantir is working on HyperAuto, which serves as the dedicated integration bridge connecting SAP’s core systems into Palantir Foundry and AIP.

You know which company worked closely with Palantir before SAP? Airbus. Palantir literally powers Airbus's digital twins via Skywise, currently used by more than half of Airbus Commercial employees giving Palantir full access to their design, manufacturing, and predictive maintenance. It came into fruition around the same time Dominic Asam moved from Airbus to SAP.

This Skyview system is what accelerated layoffs across Airbus just as Joule is supposed to accelerate layoffs across SAP. Performance management and HPOM and lower salary and benefits budgets will keep SAP employees too distracted and busy and scared to speak up.

This is a major concern for SAP shareholders because they did not vote for SAP to become a puppet for an American intelligence company. This is a major concern for SAP employees because they are supposed to work on the exact technology that will be used to fire them. This is a major concern for SAP customers because they are getting really bad AI slop in SAP products which is counterproductive for their use cases and they are asked to pay more to fund the development for Palantir. This is also a major concern for European governments because the U.S. Department of Defense found an effective way to infiltrate and cripple Europe's data sovereignty. The SAP executive board has been downplaying the significance of this cooperation

All of this because CK, the former Airbus CFO and other executive board members are making money from SAP executive bonuses and have their future set up when they leave SAP. .


CHRO Post Its

Our world class chro is starting to comment again on LinkedIn. Presence is returning post layoff and right before another in a few months. I feel a brand new post it note full of hashtags will be made soon! Love the authenticity and positivity as her team lays off and offshores the masses. 2026 will build on our successful 2025 momentum and be our best year yet!!! Watch this space we’re just getting started! Love where you work love what you do ❤️


At some point we have to say the quiet part out loud. This leadership has a proven track record of destroying value.

Under Stankey’s watch, AT&T lit tens of billions of dollars on fire. DirecTV was acquired for roughly $49B and later dumped at a fraction of that value. Time Warner was bought for about $85B, then spun off just a few years later after massive write downs, leaving shareholders with years of dead money and zero strategic payoff. Even the failed T-Mobile saga cost AT&T billions in breakup fees and spectrum giveaways.

Fast forward to today.
$20B in stock buybacks executed while the stock falls and analysts downgrade it to sell.
Operating costs rising due to five day RTO.
Bonuses at risk.
And now a brand new office campus being built from the ground up for no measurable business benefit.

This is a pattern, not bad luck. Buy high. Sell low. Spend big. Then double down instead of course correcting.

Employees see it. Wall Street sees it. The market has priced it in. Continuing to trust the same leadership to make yet another massive capital decision is reckless.

How many more billions need to be burned before accountability finally shows up?


Completely Tone Deaf and Incompetent Leadership

The leadership at AT&T is non existent. The fact they would announce building a new corporate campus than will likely cost upwards of $2 Billion while continuing to layoff hardworking, valuable employees is disgraceful. I’m sure this new campus will have all the wonderful features and amenities to highlights its lavish lifestyle existence while the peasant who are so graciously allowed to keep their jobs work in spaces that are old and filthy. Dirty bathrooms, paint peeling off walls, dirty carpets etc.

Stankey and the board are complicit in the corruption and incompetence.


Did VZ leadership and the board short the VZ stock?

They had to know the stock price would go down. Cutting the workforce does nothing to improve customer service and will make it harder to address customer issues. Cutting the design team by 40% does nothing to improve the network and network performance will degrade over time. What is the actual plan, Dan? Line your pockets and split?


James S. McDonnell Foundation

Startled to learn the JSMF has named Penny Pennington to its board of directors. She is being added to “tap into her knowledge to help give more opportunities to underserved communities in St. Louis.” This is the same woman who has laid off St. Louisans who make her millions and sends their jobs to India. Penny is creating underserved people with less opportunities in St. Louis. I cannot believe the JSMF has named her to their board. The JSMF used to be a great organization which fostered American values for Americans, not sending resources out of the country. I will no longer be contributing to the JSMF as I am severely disappointed.


Chief imbalance

There is a severe imbalance in the manager-to-employee ratio across departments. Airport teams are often unable to take time off because the company claims it cannot afford management coverage, despite having a small number of managers overseeing hundreds of employees. Meanwhile, other departments operate with two to three managers supervising teams of only six to eight employees. This disparity reflects ineffective leadership and fundamental HR mismanagement. A more responsible approach would be for senior leaders to actively evaluate each department’s structure and reallocate resources appropriately, rather than continuing to expend company funds on unnecessary and misaligned management roles.


Talent Managers survive

The TA leadership is pathetic. They cut recruiters and support but save all managers and are left with a group an individuals who can’t lead, make decisions or train a team. They are great at things that do not matter like monthly or holiday meeting that do little for morale it usually pi---s people off.

Let’s look at these managers, one saved manager, manages BRGs. The BRGs did just fine with no manager. Salary $130k

The conductor manager - runs conductor recruiting. You just laid off the whole conductor recruiting team, but kept her.

The mechanic and engineering manager, we don’t and haven’t hired one of those roles in months. Also tech and Corporate- also, not a single hire in months. In addition she’s always on FMLA.

The top TA managers were kept even though they haven’t made a solid decision or anything productive in years.

These layoffs weee driven by friendships instead of production and once again CSX has proven to be burden in Jacksonville instead of a community partner that cares about its place in the city.

Stay away from this place


Town Hall Meetings with Leaders

This latest request to fill out a form in preparation for a town hall at the branch level is a classic example of a "disconnect" in leadership. After two years of managing a team, a leader is expected to have moved beyond surface-level resumes and into an understanding of their team’s specific strengths, career aspirations, and personalities. When a manager asks for a bio this late in the game, it signals that the recognition might be performative and just a check box that she did it.
We now know we are just a set of bullet points and that she is more concerned with the optics of the meeting than the reality of our team’s work.


What a shame!

This all started with Babb when he move the corporate headquarters to Dallas to spend time with his grandchildren. Then he put Farmer in place and he is totally incompetent at running the organization. Now everyone will lose their jobs and he will ride off with millions. What a shame for the employees that care about the organization, the history and their customers.


How’d we get here?

The truth of it all is this….
Other banks made the bold claim that by the EOY there will be tremendous cost savings. Citi, like so many times in the past, did not want to be left out, so they made the same boast. Needless to say, its not unfolded as they thought. There’s been no huge cost savings to the level they thought, so they are scrambling to recoup some bucks. Cutting to the bone to feed into the shell game to the shareholders and the board “see, we saved money like we said”.

Needless to say and\or its quite evident, this does NOT affect Jane Fraser’s recent massive boost in pay. For that, just chop more heads.

This is important, never forget that Jane’s increase in salary while they are chopping heads or needlessly placing people on PIPs, has been deemed acceptable. THIS is what they think of the value you bring to the table and how expendable you truly are.


Employees happiness = profitability

I read a Forbes article on employee happiness and company performance, and it feels very relevant right now.

The research is clear that companies with higher employee happiness consistently perform better over time. Not just culturally, but financially. Engagement, innovation, productivity, retention, and customer experience all improve when people feel supported, trusted, and connected to the work.

Right now, it’s hard to ignore that employee morale at Nike feels low. At the same time, the stock price reflects broader challenges and uncertainty. Those two things are often more connected than we want to admit.

The article reinforces that compensation and perks aren’t the main drivers. Leadership trust, clarity, purpose, growth, and how decisions are communicated matter far more. This feels like an important moment for EH and TH to seriously reflect on how employee experience is being navigated and how it’s landing across the organization.

Nike has always been strongest when people believed in where we were going and felt proud of how we got there. Rebuilding morale isn’t just about culture, it’s about long-term performance.

For anyone interested, here’s the article:
https://www.forbes.com/councils/forbescoachescouncil/2024/10/04/happiness-at-work-the-new-competitive-advantage/


How does MW and MN still have a job?

If you look at performance metrics over the last 5 years, we haven’t been number one in any of them compared with the other LTIPs. In most instances we’re in the middle or at the bottom. Can’t help but chuckle when MW, MN, and the other ELT members who have been here forever talk about delivering results and being accountable when they’ll never do either. Dead last in ROCE and EPB?? Have another raise! Bunch of clowns.


Operational Cost Management (tech)?

Vps reporting to same vp’s. No thinning out. Help me understand how we’re cutting operating costs? Like seriously.
Literally hundreds of directors in sec which is a simple upgrade project su-king millions.
Resilience teams do nothing but peacock.
Half of support should be cut as vendors do the actual work.
This is getting ridiculous. Take some hard actions and let’s run lean in tech to do our part in getting Nike back in line. Jesus Christ already.


ONHD days numbered

Funding that was bragged about before shutdown is now gone

Huge Money being spent in CZ

Senior leadership jumping to other sites

No news on what were doing after news of funding lost. Iguess it takes a while to identify the bare minimum personnel to keep the lights on long enough for CZ to take over.