Thread regarding Siemens layoffs

@1ya I strongly agree with this view: the core issue with ASP is not merely authorization fees or service partner management. The deeper concern is that, in actual operation, ASP may have functioned as a mechanism to privatize Siemens China CS business resources in a disguised form.

On the surface, ASP was packaged as an Approved Service Partner model, supposedly designed to improve service coverage, expand the service network, and strengthen customer response capability. However, once we break down its business logic, it appears that customer resources, service orders, spare parts opportunities, subcontracting projects, and profit pools that originally belonged within the Siemens CS system may have been redirected to certain external companies through the label of “authorized partners.”

In other words, ASP may not simply have helped Siemens build a service ecosystem. It may have used an apparently compliant authorization mechanism to transfer part of CS’s business boundaries, project access, and profit allocation rights to a limited number of authorized companies. As a result, subcontracting arrangements that should have been subject to internal compliance scrutiny could be repackaged as “official certified partner cooperation.” Project flows that might otherwise raise conflict-of-interest concerns could then be explained as normal ASP business arrangements.

This is the most concerning part of ASP: it may have turned public CS business resources into an external resource pool controlled and allocated by a small number of people. Who received ASP authorization, who obtained project subcontracting opportunities, who took service orders, and who captured spare parts and repair revenue — if these questions lack transparent standards and independent audit, the result could easily become de facto privatization of the CS business.

Therefore, ASP should not be reviewed merely as a “service partner program.” It should be reviewed as a mechanism that may have changed the ownership and benefit allocation structure of CS business resources. The real question is this: was ASP creating service value for Siemens and its customers, or was it transferring Siemens CS business opportunities, customer resources, and profit pools to specific external entities?

If the latter cannot be ruled out, then ASP is not simply service innovation. It is the privatization of CS business under a compliance wrapper.

We should also take a serious look at a very unique and long-controversial business within Siemens China CS, or Customer Service: ASP, meaning Approved Service Partner.

On the surface, ASP appears to be an authorized service partner system. It sounds like an ecosystem initiative designed to improve service coverage, standardize external partners, and strengthen customer response capability. But if we look back at the timing of its strategic packaging and rapid expansion, it becomes clear that this business was never simple.

ASP was promoted and expanded during YDH’s tenure as CS GM, under the broader WHB system. It was presented not only as service ecosystem development, but also as channel penetration, regional coverage expansion, and customer service capability enhancement. In a sense, ASP looked like YDH’s strategic pledge of loyalty to the WHB system: through a model that appeared compliant, advanced, and ecosystem-driven, he could demonstrate his ability to open up new service resources and commercial space for the WHB system.

However, ASP has been controversial from the very beginning. As we further break down this business, the real issue is not the name “Approved Service Partner” itself, but the business logic, authorization logic, subcontracting logic, and flow of interests behind it.

This is exactly where ASP requires serious review: was it truly designed to improve service capability, or did it provide a compliance wrapper for specific subcontracting relationships? Was it protecting customer interests and Siemens’ interests, or was it using authorization licenses, project allocation, and service subcontracting to institutionalize, proceduralize, and legitimize interest chains that would otherwise be difficult to explain openly?

If ASP companies paid authorization fees to obtain an official status and then used that status to receive CS projects, service orders, or spare parts-related business, the company must review their beneficial ownership, historical relationships, project sources, and approval chains. Were there family relationships, former subordinate relationships, nominee holding arrangements, historical business ties, or abnormal benefit exchanges between certain ASP companies and relevant managers? Did certain companies receive significantly better project opportunities, pricing support, customer leads, or service resources than other partners?

ASP should not only be packaged as a service ecosystem initiative. It must withstand compliance audit, data verification, and commercial reasonableness testing. The company needs to answer not whether the ASP concept sounds attractive, but whether it truly created value for customers, generated transparent benefits for Siemens, enabled fair competition among partners, and prevented management from forming hidden interest chains through authorization and subcontracting mechanisms.

If these questions cannot be clearly explained, ASP should not simply be viewed as an innovative service model. It should be included in a focused review of historical CS subcontracting practices, authorization fee mechanisms, and potential conflicts of interest.

Half a history of imperial palace politics, ten years of Siemens Ltd China!

@1xk @1gf When these incidents are viewed together, the issue may no longer be an isolated controversy involving one manager, one business unit, or one project. It may point to long-standing systemic compliance risks and governance weaknesses within Siemens China DI management.

First, there are the issues related to WB.

The fact that JHH was still able to exit relatively safely after a major incident raises the question of whether there was protection from WB or special organizational arrangements behind the scenes. This deserves further review. In particular, within the CS system, WB had long supported and developed FGW, the person responsible for the digital business. The digital business has been viewed by many employees as an area with high profit margins, complex subcontracting relationships, and unclear project boundaries. Therefore, personnel appointments, subcontracting chains, and benefit flows in this area should be subject to a higher standard of compliance review.

During WB’s tenure as RNE GM, he brought FGW from Beijing to RNE and appointed him as RNE SE Manager. Because of the team’s special management style and its control over certain resources, some employees jokingly referred to it as the “Eastern Depot.” What is even more noteworthy is that before WB left RNE, FGW, who had not previously been truly responsible for sales management, was quickly promoted to Sales Director. Whether this promotion was based on transparent performance, capability, and organizational need, or on personal trust and internal circle-based arrangements, requires further explanation.

In addition, during WB’s time in RC, there were internal rumors that MQ spent RMB 500,000 to “buy a position.” Such rumors should not be treated as established facts. However, if such claims have circulated within the organization for a long time, the company should not simply ignore them. Instead, it should independently review appointment procedures, approval records, potential benefit exchanges, financial irregularities, and relevant personal relationships.

Second, there are the issues related to YDH.

During YDH’s tenure as CS GM, WB was serving as RNE GM, while JHH was CS RNE Manager. According to employee-level accounts, YDH was dissatisfied with JHH and intended to replace him, but WB strongly intervened. More seriously, it has been said internally that WB pressured YDH by stating: “If you replace JHH, RNE will no longer do CS business.” If this account is true, it would not merely be a normal personnel disagreement. It could indicate that a regional business leader used business resources and organizational influence to interfere with CS management authority.

The ASP project promoted by YDH during his CS GM tenure should also be reviewed in this context. On the surface, ASP stands for Approved Service Partner and appears to be a service ecosystem and authorized partner model. However, based on employee concerns, it may have functioned more like a proprietary service channel packaged under the label of “official authorization.” The key questions are: did ASP protect the commercial interests of certain managers, channels, or related parties? Were company resources, customer leads, service orders, spare parts business, and authorization benefits transferred through the ASP system to a limited number of specific partners? If ASP did not create transparent and verifiable value for customers, partners, and Siemens, but instead helped certain people build exclusive service channels, then it should be included in a compliance audit.

What is even more concerning is that since the MTS period, YDH’s positions have been promoted rapidly, while one key person has remained closely by his side: WYS.

When YDH served as Head of MTS, WYS was MTS BD Manager and was involved in pricing approvals and resource allocation. The MTS business itself has significant room for configuration and pricing. During periods of supply shortage and resource constraints, pricing approval and resource allocation authority became highly commercially sensitive.

Later, when YDH became CS GM, WYS served as CS MC Head. After that, when YDH moved into Vertical as GM, WYS became a Vertical Head. When one manager consistently brings the same key person along through multiple critical stages, business systems, and organizational transformation points, the organization should ask: is this a normal continuation of a trusted professional team based on capability and results, or is it a long-term binding relationship formed through personal trust, resource control, and circle-based coordination?

If we connect the position changes, business authority, project resources, and key organizational arrangements involving WB, YDH, JHH, FGW, and WYS, the question Siemens China DI needs to answer is not simply whether one individual has a problem. The real question is the entire management system has the real risks.

@1xj This may also explain why LL from CNP has never truly recognized YDH and has kept a clear distance from him.

From an organizational history perspective, YDH was once an important supporter within the WHB system and was placed into MC to manage MTS-related business. MTS itself is a business area with significant commercial flexibility.

There has long been a question among employees: was YDH’s approach in MTS truly about promoting complete solutions, or was it more about breaking down MTS products and solutions, then separately amplifying the high-value and high-margin components that could be more easily monetized through channels? For example, by focusing quotations and configurations around S120 and motors, significant commercial returns could still be generated through drives and motors, even if the complete control solution itself was not fully adopted.

This is why, from the perspective of the professional MC business line, YDH’s former MTS operating model may have caused strong dissatisfaction. The real concern is not simply whether one individual had a strong personality. The deeper issue is that such a model may have damaged the normal market order of the professional product line: complete solutions were broken apart, high-value hardware was amplified, pricing discipline was disrupted, channel fairness was weakened.

Therefore, LL’s lack of recognition toward YDH may appear on the surface to be a personal conflict, but in essence, it looks more like a conflict between professional business governance and circle-based resource control. Someone who values product integrity, market order, and long-term customer value would naturally find it difficult to accept a management model that creates performance through solution disassembly, channel control, hardware-margin amplification, and scarce resource allocation.

@1x2 If there is one period in YDH’s career within Siemens China DI that deserves serious compliance review, it should be his tenure as General Manager of MTS.

During his time as MTS GM, the MTS business had a very special commercial nature. Internally, some people jokingly referred to MTS as a department that “sold axes,” because the machine tool business is naturally structured around axes: three-axis machines, five-axis machines, gantry systems, turn-mill machines, and automated production lines. Every additional functional unit could bring additional revenue from drives, motors, encoders and services. This business structure created significant room for configuration design, quotation strategy, channel selection, and resource allocation. It also made the business more vulnerable to opaque commercial interest chains.

For this reason, some business practices during YDH’s tenure at MTS deserve to be reviewed. In particular, the company should examine whether certain projects involved designated channels, with customers being guided to quote based on S120 plus motors, and whether high commercial returns were still generated through drives, motors, and related configurations even when the core control unit was not actually adopted or was later abandoned. If such a model existed, it may not only have distorted real customer needs, but also disrupted the market pricing system of the GMC-related business and damaged the company’s long-term commercial credibility.

What makes this period even more sensitive is that 2018 to 2022 was a time of severe market supply shortages. During this period, product allocation, production scheduling, price approvals, and channel resource distribution had a major impact on customer relationships, market order, and the company’s commercial reputation. Who received supply, who obtained priority resources, and who gained additional commercial opportunities during the shortage cycle were all highly sensitive issues.

This may also help explain why YDH was able to move so quickly from Head of MTS to CS GM, then to MC GM, and eventually into a core leadership role within Vertical.

@1xe I can't agree more. If Tracy believes that every member of her team is incapable of performing their own role, then the company should also ask an equally basic question in return: is Tracy herself recognized and trusted by her team members?

Finally, someone mentioned Tracy.

This manager has always been very skilled at building a personal narrative: a female executive in a multinational company, a strong female corporate protagonist, and an inspirational figure who came from a humble background. There is nothing wrong with such a personal story. In fact, it can be respected. The real issue is that a manager should ultimately prove herself through actual management capability, professional judgment, team reputation, and business results, rather than relying on personal branding, packaging, and upward visibility.

Finally, someone mentioned Tracy.

This manager has always been very skilled at building a personal narrative: a female executive in a multinational company, a strong female corporate protagonist, and an inspirational figure who came from a humble background. There is nothing wrong with such a personal story. In fact, it can be respected. The real issue is that a manager should ultimately prove herself through actual management capability, professional judgment, team reputation, and business results, rather than relying on personal branding, packaging, and upward visibility.

However, under the new Vertical structure, Tracy seems to have found her position again.

Today, many employees do not evaluate her based on how well she understands the industry, customers, or how effectively she helps sales solve real business problems. Instead, the main impression is that she is extremely good at upward management. She appears highly capable of aligning herself with YDH’s system, quickly adapting to the language, reporting style, and political rhythm preferred by senior management. At the same time, her downward management appears very different: high pressure, strong control, excessive team consumption, and a tendency to turn team members into tools for her own upward visibility.

For a manager, the most dangerous thing is not having high expectations or a fast pace. The real danger is when a team’s core objective gradually shifts from “serving customers, creating business value, and improving organizational capability” to “mobilizing the entire team to satisfy senior leaders, package results that please management, and support the manager’s personal image.” When team members are consumed by this model for a long time, their mental and physical health, work enthusiasm, and trust in the organization are gradually exhausted.

What is even more concerning is that Tracy does not seem able to provide the team with clear, stable, and measurable business objectives. If a manager cannot clearly tell the team which customers they are trying to win, what problems they are solving, what value they are creating, and how success will be measured, the team will inevitably fall into endless reporting, alignment, slide revisions, and emotional pressure.

This is not normal high-performance management. It is a very dangerous management signal.

If employee satisfaction in a department remains low, intent to leave stays high, and team members generally feel suppressed and exhausted, the organization should not only look at polished reporting results. It should seriously examine the management style behind them. A manager should not be allowed to build an upward-facing image while making the entire team pay the price.

A truly excellent manager should secure resources upward, protect the team downward, and create customer value externally — not flatter upward, pressure downward, and generate anxiety internally.

Let us talk about Vertical.

If I were to evaluate the current Vertical organization, I would say it is a highly confusing organization, and in many cases, frontline teams struggle to understand its real value. The Vertical system led by YDH is, in theory, supposed to provide industry insight, customer breakthroughs, cross-BU collaboration, and growth acceleration. However, based on feedback from many employees, it often appears to be an organization that relies heavily on reporting, presentations, and internal processes to justify its own existence.

I have spoken with many colleagues from Vertical, and the recurring feedback is: “They want to lead through virtue, but they do not have the virtue or capability to match the position.” Although this statement is sharp, it accurately reflects how many employees feel. Sales teams do not necessarily have strong emotional complaints against Vertical. What they have is confusion. Apart from collecting pipelines, making PowerPoint decks that almost nobody seriously reads, and repeatedly asking sales to provide data and materials, how much time does Vertical actually spend on the frontline? What valuable support can it truly provide to sales? How many of YDH and the Vertical Heads have actually spent significant time visiting customers, deeply understanding industries, or personally driving key projects?

We can briefly look at the backgrounds of some industry Heads.

First, there are people who do not appear to have deep industry experience but have been assigned to manage certain industries. For example, CXG was previously responsible for PA DCP business; SSB was formerly a Changchun Territory Manager and had relatively close business interactions with YDH during the RNE period; Tracy was previously an FA PSS manager and came from Rockwell; WYS is a core member of YDH’s small circle and previously led CS MC business; PXS came from MC; and CQC also came from MC. These backgrounds do not automatically mean that they are incapable. However, if someone lacks long-term customer accumulation and industrial understanding in a specific sector but is directly appointed to manage that industry, it is difficult for frontline teams to be truly convinced.

Second, some Vertical Heads have career paths that highly overlap with YDH’s personal work history, such as PXS, CQC, WYS, ZJ, LHH, and others. This high degree of overlap further strengthens the employee perception of circle-based appointments. People naturally ask: were these roles assigned based on industry capability, business performance, and customer experience, or based on previous relationships, internal networks, and management preferences?

More importantly, the management capability of Vertical Heads varies significantly. For example, in the electronics sector led by Tracy, employee intent to leave has reportedly remained among the highest in Vertical in SGES satisfaction surveys. If an organization cannot even maintain basic internal trust and stability among its own employees, how can it truly provide high-quality support to business and sales?

The biggest problem with Vertical today is not that it has no theoretical value. The problem is that, in actual operation, it has not proven its practical value. People who truly understand industries are not sufficiently empowered, while people who do not understand industries are directing them. People closest to customers lack real voice, while those far from customers define the strategy. Frontline teams that actually create business results are repeatedly asked to submit materials, while those responsible for “industry management” rarely bear real accountability for outcomes.

This is the current state of Vertical in the eyes of many employees.

If Siemens China DI truly wants to carry out an effective transformation, it must seriously revisit several questions: How should the long-standing conflict between BU and SU be resolved? How should the responsibilities of TS, TSSH, and SAC be redefined? And is Vertical truly creating industry value, or is it simply creating another management layer and more internal friction?

If these questions are not addressed directly, then the so-called organizational transformation will ultimately become nothing more than another round of power redistribution, rather than a genuine reshaping focused on customers, business, and efficiency.

Now let us look at Domain.

Whether it is FA, PA, or MC, all of them went through some degree of personnel reshuffling during the previous transformation. FA remains strong and continues to hold significant organizational influence. PA, however, has long been associated with various compliance and management controversies. For example, XJ from PA PFA was reportedly complained about in other discussions regarding alleged kickbacks, non-transparent special price approvals, and potential misuse of approval authority for personal benefit. These allegations should not be treated as established facts without an independent investigation. However, the existence of such complaints and concerns already indicates that PA may have governance risks that the company should review seriously.

By comparison, MC appears to be improving in a relatively positive and stable direction. This is partly due to WZL’s rich and senior background in MC, as well as his personal professional capability. At least from the perspective of business understanding and product judgment, the current management of MC seems to be more closely connected to professional competence, rather than relying purely on organizational politics or presentation-driven management.

Now let us return to the current organizational structure.

First, SU has not fundamentally changed, while the workload of frontline TS teams has clearly exceeded a reasonable level. The capability and experience levels among TS employees vary significantly, yet management expects TS to become generalists, or even “superhumans” capable of covering all products, all industries, and all customer issues. But in reality, the technical knowledge gap between different BUs is enormous. It is impossible to complete such a capability transfer simply through organizational slogans. For example, asking an engineer with a historical MC background to support FA-related technical issues is obviously a major professional challenge.

This has led to a very ironic situation. TS, which is often compared to a “community hospital,” is extremely busy and carries a large amount of frontline customer support pressure. Meanwhile, TSSH, which is supposed to function like a “top-tier hospital,” does not appear to have a fully saturated workload and provides very limited support to real business needs. The grassroots level is overloaded, while higher-level resources are not being effectively released. This mismatch itself shows that the current support system has serious structural problems.

SAC is currently one of the most unclear and chaotic roles in terms of functional positioning. It is difficult for many people to clearly explain whether SAC is supposed to provide sales support, industry coordination, resource alignment, or simply serve as another internal management interface. What is even more ironic is that every time a region publishes a newsletter, it often includes a sentence such as “with the support of TS and SAC, we successfully won this project.” Many frontline employees understand that such wording is more about packaging organizational collaboration than accurately reflecting real contribution.

We cannot deny that WHB once built his own power structure within Siemens China DI. In a sense, he created what many employees would describe as his own “China DI dynasty.”

In the past, although the China BUs were still under the governance framework of headquarters, they had considerable influence over price approvals, resource allocation, and business decisions. This helped create the historically strong position of the China BUs, a strength that still exists to some extent today. At the same time, SU had long-standing frustrations with the BUs. The tension between BU and SU has always been a structural issue in the China organization, with both sides often positioned against each other rather than working through truly effective collaboration.

Within such an environment, WHB gradually built a network of influence by placing people close to him, or aligned with him, into key positions across different BUs. At the employee level, there has long been a perception that certain people in critical roles were not merely performing their official responsibilities, but were also directly or indirectly maintaining a fixed management circle and interest structure covering business, pricing, channels, and resource allocation.

To some extent, the weakening of the BU concept at headquarters level during the previous round of transformation was actually a major advantage for WHB. As the original BU boundaries became less dominant and new GM-level positions were reshuffled, he gained the opportunity to place people he trusted into even higher-level and more strategically important roles.

This is why many employees feel that the previous transformation did not truly break the old power structure. Instead, in some areas, it allowed the old circles to continue existing in a different form. WB, YDH, Jasmine, and ZXL have long been perceived by employees as core figures in key positions during the WHB era. Around them, different smaller circles were formed, concentrating premium customers, key resources, pricing authority, and channel influence in the hands of a limited group of people, while many grassroots employees were kept outside the real resource allocation and decision-making system.

What we could clearly observe is that, during the previous round of transformation, many GM-level appointments did not fundamentally change compared with the previous structure. Those GMs who were not aligned with the WHB system, or who did not belong to the established inner circle, either left for various reasons, were marginalized, or gradually lost real influence. Whatever the true reasons behind these changes may have been, the perception among employees is very clear: the organization appeared to be transforming on the surface, but the core power structure was not truly reshaped.

We should also talk about a very unique and long-controversial business within Siemens China CS, or Customer Service: ASP, meaning Approved Service Partner.

ASP was never just a simple service partner program. During YDH’s tenure as CS GM, it was gradually packaged as a strategic initiative and expanded in scale. Under the broader WHB system, it was presented as a key project with growth potential and organizational value. In a sense, ASP looked like YDH’s strategic pledge of loyalty to the WHB system. It could be framed as service ecosystem development, channel penetration, regional coverage expansion, and customer service capability enhancement.

However, ASP has been controversial since the beginning. When we further break down this business, the concept of ASP may reveal unrealistic ambitions and fantasies around service business expansion under WHB and YDH. It may also have been used to package, beautify, or even obscure the companies and parties that directly benefited from it.

First, the charging logic of ASP needs to be thoroughly reviewed.

There has long been a core question among employees and external observers: did Siemens charge ASP companies certain authorization fees, annual fees, certification fees, or similar commercial fees? If such fees were collected, were the business referrals, service orders, regional protection, technical resources, spare parts support, and commercial rights promised before signing actually delivered?

Based on what has been observed in practice, some ASP companies seemed to have purchased an “authorization license” but did not receive sufficient, stable, sustainable, or convertible business resources. In other words, they may have obtained Siemens’ name endorsement, but not enough customer leads, service orders, spare parts business, or repair revenue to match their investment.

At present, it is difficult to find transparent ASP annual fee standards, authorization fee standards, renewal rules, or partner exit mechanisms. Nor is there visible disclosure or systematic review of key data such as average ASP partner revenue, number of referred projects, service order conversion rates, partner ROI, regional coverage quality, or customer satisfaction.

Therefore, the company needs to answer several basic questions:

How many customer leads did each ASP receive on average?
How many actual service orders did each ASP receive?
How much spare parts business, repair revenue, and project conversion did each ASP generate?
Was the revenue sufficient to cover authorization fees, personnel investment, and maintenance costs?
Were the promised regional protection, business referrals, and technical resources actually delivered?
Were resources allocated fairly among different ASPs, or were there clear signs of preferential treatment?

If ASP companies merely paid fees to obtain a nominal status without receiving sufficient business support, then ASP should not simply be described as a successful service ecosystem initiative. It would look more like a packaged authorization-fee model.

Second, the ASP authorized company list, charging standards, and fund flows must be independently reviewed.

If the company truly wants to examine the management and compliance issues within the CS system over the past few years, it should conduct a focused review of ASP authorized companies, admission criteria, charging standards, fund flows, renewal rules, project allocation, service order conversion rates, partner ROI, and internal approval chains.

More importantly, the company needs to conduct a beneficial ownership review of ASP companies. Were any ASP companies connected to relevant managers through family relationships, nominee holding arrangements, former subordinate relationships, historical business dealings, benefit arrangements, or abnormal resource favoritism? Did certain companies receive clearly better project opportunities, pricing support, technical resources, or regional protection than others? Were approval processes artificially relaxed, commercial terms selectively adjusted, or resource allocations inconsistent with normal business logic?

These questions should not remain at the level of verbal explanations. They should be systematically examined through contracts, payment records, project flows, approval records, emails, service order data, and customer conversion data.

Third, ASP should not be evaluated only by strategic packaging. It should be judged by real commercial results.

A healthy service partner system should be able to prove three things at the same time. First, it should bring Siemens better customer coverage and service capability. Second, it should bring ASP partners sustainable commercial returns. Third, its authorization, charging, resource allocation, and project flow should comply with principles of fairness, transparency, and compliance.

If ASP was only packaged as an “ecosystem strategy,” “service network development,” or “regional coverage improvement,” but lacked real orders, real conversion, real ROI, and real customer value, then the project needs to be reassessed.

If ASP’s fee collection, resource allocation, and project referral mechanisms lacked transparency, or if specific companies appeared to benefit abnormally, then this is no longer merely a question of whether the business model succeeded. It may involve conflicts of interest and compliance risks.

Fourth, ASP needs to answer the most fundamental question: did it serve customers, partners, and Siemens, or did it serve the interests of a limited number of people?

For grassroots employees, the real concern is not whether the concept of ASP sounds advanced. The concern is whether it can withstand audit scrutiny, data verification, partner feedback, and customer feedback. If a project has long relied on strategic narratives but cannot clearly explain its charging logic, fulfillment of promises, partner returns, project allocation, and compliance boundaries, employees will naturally raise questions.

Therefore, the company should conduct an independent, transparent, and systematic review of the ASP business. The scope should at least include the list of authorized ASP companies, historical charging standards, contract terms, fund flows, partner ROI, project allocation mechanisms, implementation of regional protection, technical resource support, customer lead distribution, service order conversion, beneficial ownership review, and all relevant internal approval chains.

Only after these issues are clarified can the company determine whether ASP was truly a valuable service ecosystem project, or a special business model whose commercial and compliance questions were hidden behind strategic packaging.

@1gm From the perspective of global layoffs and organizational restructuring, it is highly unlikely that China will remain untouched.

Siemens China has a large employee base, a complex organizational structure, and a relatively large number of functional and support roles. Therefore, if Siemens pushes forward large-scale cost reduction, organizational streamlining, or workforce optimization globally, China will likely have to absorb a significant share of the pressure. In particular, under the combined impact of slower business growth, margin pressure, and the rapid rise of AI tools, roles that are repetitive, process-driven, reporting-oriented, and distant from customers and orders are likely to face greater risk.

However, what truly needs to be adjusted should not be only frontline employees. The management structure of Siemens China needs a real reshuffle.

Many of the problems exposed in China over the past few years were not created by frontline employees. They were the result of bloated management layers, imbalanced leadership appointments, opaque resource allocation, inefficient internal collaboration, and excessive formalism. If the final outcome is simply to cut execution-level employees while keeping the people who created the problems, then so-called cost reduction and efficiency improvement will become nothing more than another downward transfer of pressure.

In my view, frontline sales roles are relatively less likely to be directly affected. The reason is simple: salespeople remain closest to customers, orders, and cash flow. Frontline roles that can generate revenue, maintain customer relationships, and drive project execution still hold irreplaceable value for the company.

By contrast, functional, support, coordination, and reporting-oriented roles are more likely to be affected by the combined forces of AI and organizational streamlining. Many tasks that used to rely on manual data consolidation, slide preparation, information collection, process coordination, and repeated internal alignment may increasingly be replaced or reduced by automation tools, AI assistants, and flatter organizational structures.

Therefore, if this round of restructuring does happen, the focus should not be on cutting people by simple ratios. The company should instead answer a basic question: which roles truly create customer value, and which roles mainly create processes, reports, and internal friction?

If Siemens truly wants to improve efficiency, it should protect frontline employees who are close to the market and create real business results, while reducing inefficient management layers, eliminating redundant support roles, and carrying out a genuine structural reshuffle of the China management team.

Why the comment zone is mainly about Siemens China? How would the 20,000 layoffs distributed? Thanks.

Regarding the management issues across several BUs in China over the past years, many employees have their own understanding of what happened.

At the employee level, there has long been a perception that during the WHB era, relatively fixed networks of management influence and interest representation were formed across several key BUs. For example, YDH in MC & MTS, ZXL in FA, and WB in CS have often been perceived by employees as key figures closely connected to the senior power structure at that time.

Nobody wants to present unverified internal rumors as established facts. However, the fact that such perceptions have persisted for so long already shows that there are serious concerns within the organization regarding the transparency of leadership appointments, resource allocation, project decisions, and potential interest relationships.

What the company should really pay attention to is not merely a few individual names, but the governance issues reflected behind these perceptions. Why have certain individuals remained in key positions through different rounds of organizational restructuring? Why have core resources and decision-making power in some BUs appeared to remain concentrated within a small number of fixed circles? Why do many frontline employees feel that capability, performance, and professional experience are not the real determining factors for job security and career opportunities?

If the company truly wants to rebuild trust among employees in China, it cannot stop at personnel changes or new slogans. It should conduct a systematic review of past leadership appointments, project flows, supplier relationships, channel resource allocation, and potential conflicts of interest across key BUs.

Employees are not asking for a witch hunt. What they want is a basic answer: have the old management circles, interest networks, and protective power structures truly been dismantled? And will the new organization genuinely return to a path of fairness, professionalism, transparency, and compliance?

@1fw When the economy is rising, prosperity can cover up almost everything. When business is growing, the organization appears peaceful and successful. Management can package market tailwinds as personal capability, describe industry cycles as strategic victories, and attribute the hard work of frontline employees to their own leadership.
But when the business comes under real pressure, when growth slows and profits shrink, the problems that have long been hidden beneath the surface begin to emerge all at once. Factional culture, rent-seeking behavior, imbalanced resource allocation, management incompetence, and avoidance of responsibility all become exposed under pressure.
When times are good, everyone talks about vision, culture, and success stories. When times are difficult, the true level of an organization’s governance, management principles, and leadership logic is finally revealed.
To put it bluntly: in good times, everything looks harmonious; in hard times, chaos reveals itself. And the ones who suffer the most are always the people at the bottom — those closest to customers and most responsible for delivering real results.

I read all comments up to now. I feel that comments from Siemens China are just typical complaints when biz is going low. They would never mention how happy they were when they were in good years.

Power structure of any company is same as an autocratic country, power top down not bottom up. I think Siemens China employees must be used to the mechanism and outcome in their day to day life with their officials. If they complain about the employer, I guess they have a better object to complain about. They don’t own the company but they own their country.

@1dv The controversies surrounding WB’s management style and potential conflicts of interest seem to have been discussed for quite some time. As for his relationship with JHH, do people think it might be closer than that of a typical manager and subordinate? Also, has anyone heard the rumors about MQ allegedly “paying to secure a promotion”?

the drama here is even more interesting than Trump’s posts.

I have to admit, the stories from China are always the most dramatic.

@1e2 Thanks for sharing the information. If the allegations described are accurate, they would suggest serious governance and compliance issues at the management level, which is quite shocking.

@1e0 If that’s the case, China really is more complicated than I thought.

@1dy I assume these abbreviations refer to members of the management team in China. I tried looking through the organizational structure on Teams and found that most of the individuals mentioned appear to be from DI China Sales. However, because only initials are used and Chinese naming conventions differ from Western ones, it is difficult to identify the exact individuals involved. I hope colleagues from DI China who are familiar with the situation can provide some additional context. Stay strong, colleagues in DI China — respect from the US.

I’m a bit confused. Could any colleagues in China help explain the relationships between these letters? Like WB and YDH.

Damn, I thought Siemens AG in the US was a staple of incompetence and corruption, but you guys in China are at another level !

WB has reportedly brought his children to internal gatherings, during which his daughter received gifts or favors from sales personnel. Were these activities properly disclosed in accordance with the company’s compliance requirements? In cases involving benefits provided to employees’ family members, were the necessary conflict-of-interest disclosure procedures followed and reviewed by the compliance department?

Did WHB and WB follow the company’s established internship recruitment procedures when arranging internships for their children at DI China? Were these positions openly posted, subject to standardized screening and fair competition, and handled in accordance with the company’s policies regarding conflicts of interest and nepotism? More importantly, can these arrangements withstand compliance review and public scrutiny?

While competitors—particularly Inovance—are advancing aggressively and continuing to erode our market share, much of our organization’s energy is being consumed by so-called “reforms.” These reforms have increasingly become a pretext for internal political struggles, with key positions being filled by loyalists in pursuit of personal and factional interests.

For years, WB has relied on initiatives such as “Wendao,” “Lundao,” and the “Learn-Practice-Question-Speak-Teach” framework—activities that are highly detached from practical business and, in some cases, carry elements of personality cult and feudal-style hierarchy—to exert pressure on frontline sales teams. Endless reviews and PUA-style management are portrayed as “strengthening management.” Salespeople are forced to spend enormous amounts of time preparing one-off PowerPoint slides, and are even expected to flatter WB publicly and express gratitude for his “mentorship.” One cannot help but ask: is DI China a modern enterprise, or an organization sustained by ideological control?

At meetings attended by WHB, simply ending the presentation with an image reminiscent of historical propaganda—celebrating the Chinese Communist Party or evoking the spirit of the Great Leap Forward—together with slogans such as “Roll up our sleeves and work harder,” is often enough to earn his approval. Against such an intense atmosphere of political symbolism, one has to wonder whether DI China can still be regarded as a technology-driven German industrial company.

YDH continues to organize so-called “fireside talks” among his core followers. He portrays himself as a devout Muslim with pure faith, yet openly drinks alcohol despite the religious prohibitions. We respect all religious beliefs, but it is difficult for people to genuinely respect someone who constantly speaks of faith while acting in contradiction to the principles he professes.

The “artificial prosperity” created by shortages, the OOH driven by excessive stockpiling orders, and the pressure WHB has continued to place on distributors in order to maintain sales performance have been recurring issues over the years. Meanwhile, the margins left to distributors by FA and GMC have been squeezed to the limit.

Cross-regional price dumping remains a persistent problem, and there appears to be no effective mechanism to address such practices. This naturally raises a question: does Jasmine lack the willingness or ability to tackle these issues, or does WHB still retain significant influence behind the scenes?

At this point, PA MI products seem to be among the few areas where frontline sales teams still have some degree of control. Yet controversial figures such as XJ continue to enjoy the trust and support of LSG. Many employees find this not only puzzling, but also both ironic and disheartening.

I’ve been translating some of these Chinese posts. The truth is that the workplace issues faced by colleagues in China are not unique; employees in other countries and regions experience similar problems to varying degrees. At the end of the day, this is a German corporation run for its shareholders and executives, not a company that belongs to you or me.

@1by I couldn’t agree more. The compliance department seems little more than window dressing, and SGES feels like a box-ticking exercise. Otherwise, how do you explain why so many employees from China and the United States choose to speak out anonymously here?

People are simply venting their frustrations here. Does management really pay attention to these discussions? Do they care about the working conditions and well-being of frontline employees in the U.S. and China? Judging by their actions, the stock price appears to be their only real concern. Many employees feel that this mindset has become even more evident since DI began being led by a UK-based management team.

It seems like everyone is sale employee. I wonder how much this round of layoffs will affect SW. In SW, it doesn’t feel that bad

After watching yesterday’s DI China TAM, I couldn’t help but reflect on where we are today.

TAM has jokingly been referred to by many as “The Achim Meeting”. Ironically, that nickname may actually represent a positive sign. Headquarters is making a serious effort to become more involved in what has long been a black box known as DI China. To some extent, this also reflects a lack of confidence in the previous management model.

For years, Siemens DI China operated like a closed empire centered around WHB. Behind the polished presentations and glamorous narratives, many uncomfortable realities were carefully concealed. WHB built what was once considered the DI China empire, but today that empire is showing deep cracks and signs of decline. Some of the people who contributed to these problems still occupy key positions.

The current organizational culture and working atmosphere have deteriorated to an alarming level. SGES, in particular, has become something of a joke: when problems cannot be solved, the people who raise those problems become the targets instead.

There is no shortage of middle managers whose capabilities are far below the responsibilities they hold. Yet through political alignment and skillful upward management, they continue to secure their positions. Employees are constantly subjected to pressure and manipulation, while these managers endlessly glorify their past achievements. At the same time, they remain detached from the front line of the business, offering no meaningful guidance or strategic direction. Their understanding of the business is close to zero, their involvement is close to zero, and much of their decision-making resembles little more than armchair engineering.

Another example is the increasingly questionable management practices surrounding special pricing within PA. XJ appear to have benefited disproportionately from loopholes and irregularities in instrument-related pricing policies, while the system itself lacks sufficient transparency and accountability.

What DI China needs today is not more slogans, PowerPoint presentations, or self-congratulation. It needs accountability, transparency, leaders who understand the business firsthand, and a culture that rewards competence rather than politics.

Otherwise, no amount of restructuring or headquarters intervention will be enough to reverse the decline.

It is exaggerate to say that hundreds of employees are resigning everyday, but it is true that the attrition is strong and the best employees have left over the past 2 years. And so far, they are just replaced with interns or very young people out of their degree and who were struggling to find a first job. But without seniors to lead the activity, it is doomed to fail. It is also true that the nepotism is rampant in this company. In the US the managers are young people in their 20ies and sent from Germany. They have 0 experience in management, at doing business, and just basically knowing how things works in the US ecosystem. There was an infamous case in Technology where the young manager was the daughter of someone from the board or something like that.

Anyone from the Digital industry Software division can give an view on how are things there?

Move on!! Everyone is resigning in the United States. They know layoffs are coming. Siemens is a mess of a company.

We must stand together as people and not let these CEOs and Nepotism throughout our countries dictate the future of our financial well being. What these appointed leaders are doing to us is wrong on all level. All for the profit and alignment of there luxury lifestyles while we the people suffer. Enough is enough and we must have enough integrity to stand up against this corruption. Siemens has extorted massive amounts of profits for over 100 years through the government alignment and private sector exploitation. We can no longer stand for big companies dictating our well being and need to take a stand as a global economic movement to stop this once and for all. If we continue to feed this system the system will only continue to fail us. No person for that matter should have to sacrifice their mental health and well being for these people who care nothing about anything except profits and financial gain. Enough is enough and we must stand together as a whole to put an end to this system of corruption and capitalism at the expense of our hard working and dedicated lives.

Try working in the US Branches. They are littered with horrific managers who have no right being in management positions. Employees are resigning by the hundreds daily. They know what's coming. Trying to get ahead of their careers instead of letting Siemens destroy their opportunities. It's beyond disappointing.