Thread regarding Siemens layoffs

I've read these comments, and frankly, they're all just venting of personal frustrations. DI's problems are now a global issue; there's a massive global organizational transformation underway, with multiple adjustments made to organizational structures over the past two years. This isn't just happening in one country, but a global shift in organizational structure. In reality, upon closer inspection, this change lacks innovation; it's simply a shift from a vertical to a horizontal structure, and from decentralized to centralized control. DI's biggest problem now is that it's constantly tinkering with its organizational structure, neglecting to focus on technological and product innovation—this is the most worrying aspect.

In fact, what the company should pay the most attention to now is the younger generation of managers and high-potential talents.

Under the current chaos, internal friction, and crisis of trust, many younger managers may be forced to step onto the battlefield earlier than expected. Ideally, they should grow in a relatively healthy, transparent, and orderly organizational environment, gradually accumulating business experience, team experience, and management experience. But now, what they may be facing is an organization that has already been seriously distorted by the previous round of transformation: unclear rules, blurred responsibilities, entrenched circles, declining trust, and exhausted frontline teams.

Why did the previous round of reform in DI China gradually lose its original meaning? I believe the most fundamental reason is the loss of ownership.

A transformation should have energized the organization and created more space for people with real capability, responsibility, and business understanding. But what the previous reform actually brought to many young employees and young managers was the opposite. Those who were highly motivated, willing to take responsibility, and eager to prove themselves through professionalism and performance were repeatedly frustrated during round after round of organizational adjustment. What they eventually saw was a harsh reality: in DI China, capability often matters less than relationships, professionalism matters less than taking sides, and doing real work matters less than reporting well.

Once the younger generation sees this clearly, ownership naturally collapses. People begin to ask: if those who truly do the work are not necessarily seen, if those with real capability are not necessarily promoted, and if those who create value are not necessarily given opportunities, why should I still treat the company’s business as my own? Why should I devote myself fully to an organization that is unfair, opaque, and does not truly respect execution?

As a result, more and more people no longer focus on how to do their jobs well, how to serve customers, or how to win in the market. Instead, they focus on how to please leaders, how to stand on the right side, how to appear important in reports, and how to use various methods to satisfy their direct managers and senior leaders.

This is not a problem of one department, nor is it simply that a few employees have changed their attitude. It is a systemic failure from top to bottom. And the source of this failure, to a large extent, comes from the management logic formed during the WHB era: placing loyalists and trusted insiders into key GM-level positions, while those GMs further copied, amplified, and solidified the same culture downward. In the end, the entire organization developed a dangerous inertia: people at the top select their own people, and people below do the same; the top values relationships, and the lower levels follow; the top values packaging, and the lower levels continue to package.

The loss of ownership directly causes frontline employees to lose passion for their work. In the past, many employees were proud of SIEMENS. They were willing to fight for customers, projects, and technology. Back then, even though departments also faced pressure, many teams still had a sense of “small family culture”: people trusted each other, supported each other, and were willing to go the extra mile for a shared goal.

But now, frequent reorganizations have broken many previously stable team relationships. Newly appointed department leaders often neglect the cultivation of departmental culture. They do not care whether the team still has cohesion, whether employees still feel a sense of belonging, or whether grassroots employees can still withstand the pressure. What they truly care about is often where they will go next, how to present themselves upward, and how to secure their own positions in the new organization. As for the team, they rarely exert positive influence, let alone build trust, inspire morale, or develop talent.

Enough names have already been mentioned in the comment section. What people truly care about is not simply attacking one individual. The real question is this: among those who have held, or still hold, GM positions, middle-management roles, or key resource positions, how many can withstand a truly transparent review? How many of their promotion paths, resource allocations, project flows, and team management practices can stand up to the combined scrutiny of compliance review, employee feedback, and business results?

If DI China truly wants to rebuild organizational trust, it cannot rely on superficial reform. It cannot simply change organizational names, reporting lines, or PowerPoint templates, nor can it continue to make grassroots employees bear the cost of reform. What is truly needed is a thorough reselection and cleanup of management and middle-level leadership.

A short period of pain is better than prolonged suffering.

If the old system, old circles, and old mindset continue to occupy key positions, any reform will be absorbed, distorted, and turned back by them. Only by truly clearing out the harmful management inertia left from the WHB era, breaking the culture of favoritism and taking sides, and allowing a new generation of managers with real ownership, capability, customer awareness, and organizational responsibility to step forward, can DI China truly release the value of reform.

Otherwise, so-called reform will continue to consume the frontline, exhaust young talents, and turn excellent employees from people who were once proud of SIEMENS into people who simply stand aside, disengage, and lie flat.

I hope the company can put an end to the current chaos and internal friction as soon as possible, and truly relieve the long-standing pressure on frontline employees.

The people who suffer the most and are consumed the most are always the grassroots and frontline employees. Frontline employees are paid relatively modest salaries, yet they carry the heaviest business pressure, customer pressure, delivery pressure, and internal reporting pressure. They have to visit customers, push projects forward, carry targets, solve problems, follow processes, and repeatedly submit materials. The people closest to customers, orders, and the market are the ones bearing the most direct and heavy pressure inside the organization.

By contrast, certain managers such as WB and YDH seem to only need to talk, deliver empty strategic slogans, and arrange round after round of PowerPoint presentations, reports, and so-called reform initiatives that have little real business value, while still receiving the highest levels of compensation and resources from the company. They do not truly face customers, do not truly bear frontline pressure, and rarely take direct responsibility for organizational chaos or management failure. In the end, the strategy sounds polished, the slides look refined, but the pressure is passed downward layer by layer, and the ones who pay the price are always the grassroots employees.

Frontline employees are resilient. People are willing to fight, and they are willing to continue carrying business, visiting customers, and protecting orders even in a difficult market environment. But resilience is not unlimited, and neither is patience. When an organization allows grassroots employees to bear all the pressure for results while the managers who created the problems continue sitting comfortably in high positions, such unfairness will sooner or later exhaust the team’s trust, morale, and fighting spirit.

Perhaps what DI China truly needs now is not reform in name only. It is not about changing a few organizational labels, drawing a few new org charts, or introducing another set of reporting templates. What is truly needed is a serious reassessment, reselection, and reshuffling of the management team and middle-level leadership.

If the old power structure is not broken, if the circles, inertia, and harmful management mindset left from the WHB era continue to exist, and if those who have long survived through relationships, packaging, reporting, and upward management still occupy key positions, then any so-called reform will eventually be absorbed and distorted by the old system. It may even become just another round of internal power redistribution.

If the company truly wants to unlock the real impact of reform, it must clean up the old forces, old thinking, and old interest structures that prevent the organization from operating in a healthy way. It must allow people who truly understand the business, understand customers, solve problems, and take responsibility to move into key positions. It must show grassroots employees that capability matters more than relationships, real execution matters more than performance theater, customer value matters more than internal reporting, and organizational fairness matters more than power protection.

Otherwise, so-called reform will continue to exist only in PowerPoint slides, while the patience and trust of frontline employees will be gradually exhausted.

@35p The drinking culture is global, not just a China issue.

@338 感觉也没多少人关注吧，能关注的早就有行动了

Is no one going to talk about the so-called China DI drinking culture?

Internally, people are expected to drink three or four times a week. There are constant dinners, drinking sessions, relationship maintenance, and upward socializing. During the day, we sit in meetings. At night, we drink. The next day, we still have to submit endless PowerPoint decks, countless spreadsheets, pipeline updates, and new forecast versions.

So I want to ask one simple question: under this kind of working rhythm, when exactly are frontline salespeople supposed to visit customers? When are we supposed to do real business? When are we supposed to understand customer needs, push projects forward, solve problems, and create orders?

The company talks about being customer-centric every day. It talks about growth and transformation every day. But in reality, a huge amount of frontline time is consumed by internal reporting, meaningless socializing, drinking culture, and formalistic materials. The people closest to customers have no time to meet customers, while the organizations that are supposed to support the business keep demanding more materials from the frontline. That is the biggest irony.

If management judges whether a salesperson is “reliable” not by whether they win orders, solve customer problems, or create real business value, but by whether they can drink, attend dinners, make PowerPoint decks, and perform loyalty in internal settings, then this company will only move further away from real customers and the market.

Frontline people are not unwilling to fight, nor are we unwilling to run the business. The real question is: does the company want us to serve customers, or to serve internal processes and drinking-table culture?

既然这么多人关注这些话题，应该有更多的爆料和吐槽，这是一个真正的匿名发表。你还想这种情况继续下去吗？还想让这么多人在其位不谋其政吗？已经有很多领导层在关注了，已经在起到积极的作用了，那么就应该推举更多务实的人去做更积极的事情。

Since everyone is talking about CS, I will add another part.

FW, now one of the key figures in CS, are you starting to feel nervous?

In just a few years, you moved from a grassroots CS SSS role all the way up to Section Manager, a position just below the GM level. WB promoted you, YDH promoted you, and now, under WT, you continue to be heavily relied upon. What exactly explains such a rapid rise and continuous support from different key managers? It is hard to believe that this can be explained simply by saying “strong capability.”

As the person now controlling core CS resources and influence, you should know better than anyone that what supported your rise was never just a few visible “framework agreements” or image-driven showcase projects. Those projects packaged as customer breakthroughs, strategic cooperation, or service ecosystem development deserve to be reviewed carefully: what costs were actually paid behind them, how resources were allocated, how special prices were applied for, and how projects eventually flowed to subcontractors.

In the past, CS repeatedly took projects at almost any cost, then went to different BU GMs to request special prices. The real question is: were those price concessions truly passed on to customers to help Siemens win long-term business, or were they used through project packaging and subcontracting arrangements to benefit specific subcontractors, ultimately creating profit space for certain individuals?

If a project appears on the surface to be about CS creating customer value, but the actual execution relies heavily on specific external subcontractors; if the pricing space given up by the company did not truly turn into customer value, but instead flowed through subcontracting chains to a limited number of specific entities; if framework agreements were merely used as tools to package resource flows and project allocation, then this is no longer a normal business strategy issue. It becomes a compliance issue that must be seriously reviewed.

Therefore, FW and the CS resource chain under his control, especially the ASP business, should become key areas for investigation. The company needs to conduct a penetrating review: which framework agreements was FW involved in? Which projects applied for special prices? Who ultimately benefited from those price concessions? Which subcontractors have long been receiving CS projects? Do these subcontractors have any historical relationships, benefit exchanges, former subordinate relationships, nominee holding arrangements, or abnormal resource favoritism involving FW, the ASP system, or relevant managers?

What needs to be reviewed is not only FW’s personal promotion path, but whether an implicit closed loop has been formed among price approvals, project acquisition, subcontracting arrangements, ASP authorization, resource allocation, and benefit flows within the CS business.

If Siemens China DI truly wants to face the problems within the CS system seriously, then FW and the ASP business should be among the highest priorities for review.

First of all, YDH’s management capability is obvious to everyone. Many employees do not see his style as merely “strong management.” Instead, it is widely perceived as a typical local-emperor, gangster-style management approach: internally, he strongly supports his own loyalists and inner circle, while externally he is highly skilled at flattering upward, managing upward, and spending enormous energy pleasing senior leadership and protecting his own position.

More importantly, his understanding of the current business is almost nonexistent. Even today, his thinking remains stuck in the old CS and MTS era. He repeatedly talks about his so-called past successes, yet he is unable to provide any meaningful judgment on today’s market environment, customer changes, competitive landscape, or real business pain points. When someone constantly boasts about a past that is already outdated, or even difficult to verify, it only shows his lack of confidence in the present and his lack of ability to face real business problems.

The exposure of the former CS ASP business and MTS business in other posts also reveals a very clear logic: under that system, rapid promotion was not necessarily driven by real business capability. It seemed more closely tied to whether someone could continuously provide value and benefits to the WHB system.

The MTS business in particular deserves serious questioning. If an actual three-axis machine tool was sold and configured under the logic of a six-axis machine tool, then where did the extra three-axis-related configuration go? How were the corresponding S120 components, motors, drives, encoders, IO, safety components, and the related pricing space ultimately handled?

YDH should answer one very specific question: were those additional configurations, SPR applications, price approvals, and product allocation arrangements entirely based on real customer needs and Siemens’ compliance processes? Or were they absorbed and monetized through certain specific channels, related parties, or so-called “white gloves”?

This is not merely a question of management style. It is a core issue involving the MTS business model, pricing discipline, resource allocation, and compliance risk.

Under the Halo: Siemens Automation’s “Midlife Crisis” in China

As a former TSS, looking at the current state of DI China, there are many things I feel compelled to say. People inside the industry know very well that Siemens is experiencing a slow, boiling-frog-style decline in the Chinese market. Although high-end PLCs, S120 drives, and TIA Portal software still have a group of technical followers, the serious question is: how much longer can Siemens continue to live off these old advantages?

1. Product Competitiveness: Apart from the Brand, What Is Left?

Smart PLC is a typical “wolf in sheep’s clothing.” It carries the Siemens brand name and sells in large volumes, but in terms of technical performance and ease of use, it has already been surpassed by domestic competitors. This is a fact even headquarters has acknowledged. HMI panels are even more of a value-for-money black hole. The newly released Unified Panel has had frequent issues, and regional TS teams have spent most of their energy cleaning up the mess it created.

As for drive products, if they were not tied to the Siemens ecosystem, how many customers would still choose them with their own feet? Once the brand filter is removed, both ease of use and product quality are no longer worthy of the golden Siemens name.

Is software the last moat? Perhaps. But how many small and medium-sized enterprises in China can TIA Portal truly cover? Large customers may still be deeply locked in, but that is historical inertia, not a future advantage. R&D efficiency and decision-making power remain in Germany, while local improvement moves at a snail’s pace.

1. Organizational Internal Friction: A Paradise for the Idle, a He-l for the Doers

Frontline sales and technical staff still have passion, but the company’s incentive mechanism is rigid, the SPR application process is cumbersome, and market strategy is chaotic. Distributor margins are as thin as paper, and many are turning to competitors. The departments and individuals who genuinely solve problems are marginalized, while old BU veterans who are good at upward management and coasting along continue to sit comfortably in safe positions.

The so-called “Expert” system has become a joke. Internal engineering certification requires people to write nearly one hundred pages of papers. During the defense, reviewers point fingers at frontline projects but cannot offer any useful suggestions. Global core experts have outdated knowledge, cling to old products, and know almost nothing about applications in emerging industries.

Certain “expert teams,” represented by people like Ge Peng, produce empty output. During reviews, they are still asking about outdated concepts like the “rice-character diagram,” while being unable to clearly explain digital architecture. They call themselves the ceiling of automation, yet they have long been disconnected from the frontline.

What is even more ironic is that they draw high salaries and travel around under the banner of workshops, turning themselves into a gatekeeping class of technical bureaucrats. Regional TSS Managers are no different. Having occupied their positions for more than a decade, how much technical thinking can they still have? Many have become local power brokers, taking advantage of their regional authority. How many members of China management are truly customer-centric? Every position seems trapped in short-term thinking.

3. The Frontline Dilemma: “Insiders” Who Are Treated with Suspicion

The new TS role is in an awkward position. Sales teams guard against Technical Sales, fearing that they may be replaced. Cooperation among TSS teams is weak, and internal friction is severe. Those who can solve problems are exhausted to death, while those who are good at reporting rise to the top. In such an environment, who would still be willing to fight wholeheartedly for technology?

Conclusion

Siemens’ decline in China does not come from external competition alone. It comes from internal arrogance and inertia. Market share still exists, but that is inertia, not a moat. Customers are voting with their feet, while Siemens is still living off its past advantages.

The question is: how many more years can these old advantages last?

@2de Totally agree with this comment, I have experienced the same thing in Technology US. I have also seen the d-mbest person in my group getting promoted to senior and then got the manager role. But I think it makes sense: higher management is afraid of smart people who are going to think too much, shake the tree and flip upside down the table. They just want yes men that will follow the orders, and keep safe the whole coterie of managers. It's a like a Ponzi scheme. I also agree that buildings are empty, I really don't know how they manage to conserve that kind of real estate without any serious activity inside. There is so much money spent for nothing in this company, if it was a small business it would be bankrupt in a matter of days. I don't think the whole company is going to collapse, but I would not be surprised that Siemens will experience a Intel moment, when they realize that they have fade away behind the competition and they need to cut most of the company to just focus on a small activity that is still bringing revenue.

@2e0 Stay strong, colleagues in US — respect from the China.

Management doesn't care and they certainly don't read these threads. Our GM flaunts around the office without a care. We have lost over 100m in business for building technologies over the past decade and not 1 manager in the office cares. Siemens overpays them north of $200k + and allows unlimited PTO and zero accountability. The employees suffer immensely. We can't retain anyone with knowledge and talent because they are too smart to stay with a company that has allowed such atrocious behavior and practices. This has been years in the making of layers upon layers of bureaucracy and corruption among the leaders in this organization. The US must be gaining revenue from somewhere because our branch in the Northeast hasn't sold a decent project in over a decade. The entire senior sales team except for a few bottom feeders who manipulate the system and company have left the organization and we are left with Inexperience and unambitious personnel. The managers are all former low performing sales reps who have no clue how to manage a team or company and let everyone do whatever they want without any directions or accountability. The place is a complete carnival filled with clowns. The employees never show up to work and the sales numbers are dismal if any with zero profit. The senior leadership team has visited once a year and they laugh and say the company is doing great, life is fantastic and I'm sure it is for them as they fly in and fly out while doing absolutely nothing PH - JG and Company. They all know who they are and they all know how they have been manipulating the Siemens system for years su-king outrageous salaries out of this company while making life for the employees a living he-l. It's sad and unfortunate for us hardworking employees who built this company and show up every day and night sacrificing our family time and freedoms while these sick and twisted managers get away with this. We need to stand up together for once and push back. If not - the machine will win and they will continue to abuse there privileges while taking advantage of us hardworking employees who working employees. We need to demand more structure and better wages. We need to demand accountability for these managers once and for all. Let's stand together and fight this fight together. Or let this company fall apart like it should and let's walk out with our heads held high.

It's getting ugly real fast

America is worse. Management is terrible. The d-mber you are the longer you stay and higher you get promoted. The leaders are horrific. We just hired 2 managers from Walmart with zero industry knowledge or experience just to fill the role because nobody applies to Siemens anymore. We also shuffled a few burned out sales representatives into management roles just to fill the seats. They also come from opposed industries with zero experience. The office culture is terrible and managerial leadership laughs because they are overpaid and don't care about the employees under them. In my opinion after serving 18 years in the field for building automation this company is on the fast track for failure across the board. They must be making money from somewhere to keep out empty 40,000 square foot office open but I can tell you with 100% certainty that nobody ever is in the office including the managers 5 days a week. It's a ghost town and wasted money. The employees are beyond disconnected and nothing gets done. The phone rings and rings from angry customers but nobody ever answers or resolves anything. This is my last month working for Siemens as I have been offered much more money and structure to work for a competitor so this is why I am venting the honesty of what life is like working for Siemens US. It's a complete mess and sad but I am happy I finally made the decision for myself to move on from this nightmare of a company. I can only hope that other employees especially veterans have the same integrity to hang it up and move on to better serve yourselves. God bless and good luck to all. The ship has sunk

@1cz @1cz XJ and LSG must be in cahoots, otherwise XJ wouldn't have so much power.Especially their recent bargain-hunting price for SPHA products in the semiconductor branch.

In terms of layoffs, yesterday DISW LCS let go of 16% of Product Marketing, DISW also let go the entirety of PFD organization in Americas and Asia not sure about Europe. CSM role was also eliminated in the DISW.

I heard recently that EDA will be fully absorbed into DISW next month - not sure what that means for duplicated roles but I can guess.

@1ya I strongly agree with this view: the core issue with ASP is not merely authorization fees or service partner management. The deeper concern is that, in actual operation, ASP may have functioned as a mechanism to privatize Siemens China CS business resources in a disguised form.

On the surface, ASP was packaged as an Approved Service Partner model, supposedly designed to improve service coverage, expand the service network, and strengthen customer response capability. However, once we break down its business logic, it appears that customer resources, service orders, spare parts opportunities, subcontracting projects, and profit pools that originally belonged within the Siemens CS system may have been redirected to certain external companies through the label of “authorized partners.”

In other words, ASP may not simply have helped Siemens build a service ecosystem. It may have used an apparently compliant authorization mechanism to transfer part of CS’s business boundaries, project access, and profit allocation rights to a limited number of authorized companies. As a result, subcontracting arrangements that should have been subject to internal compliance scrutiny could be repackaged as “official certified partner cooperation.” Project flows that might otherwise raise conflict-of-interest concerns could then be explained as normal ASP business arrangements.

This is the most concerning part of ASP: it may have turned public CS business resources into an external resource pool controlled and allocated by a small number of people. Who received ASP authorization, who obtained project subcontracting opportunities, who took service orders, and who captured spare parts and repair revenue — if these questions lack transparent standards and independent audit, the result could easily become de facto privatization of the CS business.

Therefore, ASP should not be reviewed merely as a “service partner program.” It should be reviewed as a mechanism that may have changed the ownership and benefit allocation structure of CS business resources. The real question is this: was ASP creating service value for Siemens and its customers, or was it transferring Siemens CS business opportunities, customer resources, and profit pools to specific external entities?

If the latter cannot be ruled out, then ASP is not simply service innovation. It is the privatization of CS business under a compliance wrapper.

We should also take a serious look at a very unique and long-controversial business within Siemens China CS, or Customer Service: ASP, meaning Approved Service Partner.

On the surface, ASP appears to be an authorized service partner system. It sounds like an ecosystem initiative designed to improve service coverage, standardize external partners, and strengthen customer response capability. But if we look back at the timing of its strategic packaging and rapid expansion, it becomes clear that this business was never simple.

ASP was promoted and expanded during YDH’s tenure as CS GM, under the broader WHB system. It was presented not only as service ecosystem development, but also as channel penetration, regional coverage expansion, and customer service capability enhancement. In a sense, ASP looked like YDH’s strategic pledge of loyalty to the WHB system: through a model that appeared compliant, advanced, and ecosystem-driven, he could demonstrate his ability to open up new service resources and commercial space for the WHB system.

However, ASP has been controversial from the very beginning. As we further break down this business, the real issue is not the name “Approved Service Partner” itself, but the business logic, authorization logic, subcontracting logic, and flow of interests behind it.

This is exactly where ASP requires serious review: was it truly designed to improve service capability, or did it provide a compliance wrapper for specific subcontracting relationships? Was it protecting customer interests and Siemens’ interests, or was it using authorization licenses, project allocation, and service subcontracting to institutionalize, proceduralize, and legitimize interest chains that would otherwise be difficult to explain openly?

If ASP companies paid authorization fees to obtain an official status and then used that status to receive CS projects, service orders, or spare parts-related business, the company must review their beneficial ownership, historical relationships, project sources, and approval chains. Were there family relationships, former subordinate relationships, nominee holding arrangements, historical business ties, or abnormal benefit exchanges between certain ASP companies and relevant managers? Did certain companies receive significantly better project opportunities, pricing support, customer leads, or service resources than other partners?

ASP should not only be packaged as a service ecosystem initiative. It must withstand compliance audit, data verification, and commercial reasonableness testing. The company needs to answer not whether the ASP concept sounds attractive, but whether it truly created value for customers, generated transparent benefits for Siemens, enabled fair competition among partners, and prevented management from forming hidden interest chains through authorization and subcontracting mechanisms.

If these questions cannot be clearly explained, ASP should not simply be viewed as an innovative service model. It should be included in a focused review of historical CS subcontracting practices, authorization fee mechanisms, and potential conflicts of interest.

Half a history of imperial palace politics, ten years of Siemens Ltd China!

@1xk @1gf When these incidents are viewed together, the issue may no longer be an isolated controversy involving one manager, one business unit, or one project. It may point to long-standing systemic compliance risks and governance weaknesses within Siemens China DI management.

First, there are the issues related to WB.

The fact that JHH was still able to exit relatively safely after a major incident raises the question of whether there was protection from WB or special organizational arrangements behind the scenes. This deserves further review. In particular, within the CS system, WB had long supported and developed FGW, the person responsible for the digital business. The digital business has been viewed by many employees as an area with high profit margins, complex subcontracting relationships, and unclear project boundaries. Therefore, personnel appointments, subcontracting chains, and benefit flows in this area should be subject to a higher standard of compliance review.

During WB’s tenure as RNE GM, he brought FGW from Beijing to RNE and appointed him as RNE SE Manager. Because of the team’s special management style and its control over certain resources, some employees jokingly referred to it as the “Eastern Depot.” What is even more noteworthy is that before WB left RNE, FGW, who had not previously been truly responsible for sales management, was quickly promoted to Sales Director. Whether this promotion was based on transparent performance, capability, and organizational need, or on personal trust and internal circle-based arrangements, requires further explanation.

In addition, during WB’s time in RC, there were internal rumors that MQ spent RMB 500,000 to “buy a position.” Such rumors should not be treated as established facts. However, if such claims have circulated within the organization for a long time, the company should not simply ignore them. Instead, it should independently review appointment procedures, approval records, potential benefit exchanges, financial irregularities, and relevant personal relationships.

Second, there are the issues related to YDH.

During YDH’s tenure as CS GM, WB was serving as RNE GM, while JHH was CS RNE Manager. According to employee-level accounts, YDH was dissatisfied with JHH and intended to replace him, but WB strongly intervened. More seriously, it has been said internally that WB pressured YDH by stating: “If you replace JHH, RNE will no longer do CS business.” If this account is true, it would not merely be a normal personnel disagreement. It could indicate that a regional business leader used business resources and organizational influence to interfere with CS management authority.

The ASP project promoted by YDH during his CS GM tenure should also be reviewed in this context. On the surface, ASP stands for Approved Service Partner and appears to be a service ecosystem and authorized partner model. However, based on employee concerns, it may have functioned more like a proprietary service channel packaged under the label of “official authorization.” The key questions are: did ASP protect the commercial interests of certain managers, channels, or related parties? Were company resources, customer leads, service orders, spare parts business, and authorization benefits transferred through the ASP system to a limited number of specific partners? If ASP did not create transparent and verifiable value for customers, partners, and Siemens, but instead helped certain people build exclusive service channels, then it should be included in a compliance audit.

What is even more concerning is that since the MTS period, YDH’s positions have been promoted rapidly, while one key person has remained closely by his side: WYS.

When YDH served as Head of MTS, WYS was MTS BD Manager and was involved in pricing approvals and resource allocation. The MTS business itself has significant room for configuration and pricing. During periods of supply shortage and resource constraints, pricing approval and resource allocation authority became highly commercially sensitive.

Later, when YDH became CS GM, WYS served as CS MC Head. After that, when YDH moved into Vertical as GM, WYS became a Vertical Head. When one manager consistently brings the same key person along through multiple critical stages, business systems, and organizational transformation points, the organization should ask: is this a normal continuation of a trusted professional team based on capability and results, or is it a long-term binding relationship formed through personal trust, resource control, and circle-based coordination?

If we connect the position changes, business authority, project resources, and key organizational arrangements involving WB, YDH, JHH, FGW, and WYS, the question Siemens China DI needs to answer is not simply whether one individual has a problem. The real question is the entire management system has the real risks.

@1xj This may also explain why LL from CNP has never truly recognized YDH and has kept a clear distance from him.

From an organizational history perspective, YDH was once an important supporter within the WHB system and was placed into MC to manage MTS-related business. MTS itself is a business area with significant commercial flexibility.

There has long been a question among employees: was YDH’s approach in MTS truly about promoting complete solutions, or was it more about breaking down MTS products and solutions, then separately amplifying the high-value and high-margin components that could be more easily monetized through channels? For example, by focusing quotations and configurations around S120 and motors, significant commercial returns could still be generated through drives and motors, even if the complete control solution itself was not fully adopted.

This is why, from the perspective of the professional MC business line, YDH’s former MTS operating model may have caused strong dissatisfaction. The real concern is not simply whether one individual had a strong personality. The deeper issue is that such a model may have damaged the normal market order of the professional product line: complete solutions were broken apart, high-value hardware was amplified, pricing discipline was disrupted, channel fairness was weakened.

Therefore, LL’s lack of recognition toward YDH may appear on the surface to be a personal conflict, but in essence, it looks more like a conflict between professional business governance and circle-based resource control. Someone who values product integrity, market order, and long-term customer value would naturally find it difficult to accept a management model that creates performance through solution disassembly, channel control, hardware-margin amplification, and scarce resource allocation.

@1x2 If there is one period in YDH’s career within Siemens China DI that deserves serious compliance review, it should be his tenure as General Manager of MTS.

During his time as MTS GM, the MTS business had a very special commercial nature. Internally, some people jokingly referred to MTS as a department that “sold axes,” because the machine tool business is naturally structured around axes: three-axis machines, five-axis machines, gantry systems, turn-mill machines, and automated production lines. Every additional functional unit could bring additional revenue from drives, motors, encoders and services. This business structure created significant room for configuration design, quotation strategy, channel selection, and resource allocation. It also made the business more vulnerable to opaque commercial interest chains.

For this reason, some business practices during YDH’s tenure at MTS deserve to be reviewed. In particular, the company should examine whether certain projects involved designated channels, with customers being guided to quote based on S120 plus motors, and whether high commercial returns were still generated through drives, motors, and related configurations even when the core control unit was not actually adopted or was later abandoned. If such a model existed, it may not only have distorted real customer needs, but also disrupted the market pricing system of the GMC-related business and damaged the company’s long-term commercial credibility.

What makes this period even more sensitive is that 2018 to 2022 was a time of severe market supply shortages. During this period, product allocation, production scheduling, price approvals, and channel resource distribution had a major impact on customer relationships, market order, and the company’s commercial reputation. Who received supply, who obtained priority resources, and who gained additional commercial opportunities during the shortage cycle were all highly sensitive issues.

This may also help explain why YDH was able to move so quickly from Head of MTS to CS GM, then to MC GM, and eventually into a core leadership role within Vertical.

@1xe I can't agree more. If Tracy believes that every member of her team is incapable of performing their own role, then the company should also ask an equally basic question in return: is Tracy herself recognized and trusted by her team members?

Finally, someone mentioned Tracy.

This manager has always been very skilled at building a personal narrative: a female executive in a multinational company, a strong female corporate protagonist, and an inspirational figure who came from a humble background. There is nothing wrong with such a personal story. In fact, it can be respected. The real issue is that a manager should ultimately prove herself through actual management capability, professional judgment, team reputation, and business results, rather than relying on personal branding, packaging, and upward visibility.

Finally, someone mentioned Tracy.

This manager has always been very skilled at building a personal narrative: a female executive in a multinational company, a strong female corporate protagonist, and an inspirational figure who came from a humble background. There is nothing wrong with such a personal story. In fact, it can be respected. The real issue is that a manager should ultimately prove herself through actual management capability, professional judgment, team reputation, and business results, rather than relying on personal branding, packaging, and upward visibility.

However, under the new Vertical structure, Tracy seems to have found her position again.

Today, many employees do not evaluate her based on how well she understands the industry, customers, or how effectively she helps sales solve real business problems. Instead, the main impression is that she is extremely good at upward management. She appears highly capable of aligning herself with YDH’s system, quickly adapting to the language, reporting style, and political rhythm preferred by senior management. At the same time, her downward management appears very different: high pressure, strong control, excessive team consumption, and a tendency to turn team members into tools for her own upward visibility.

For a manager, the most dangerous thing is not having high expectations or a fast pace. The real danger is when a team’s core objective gradually shifts from “serving customers, creating business value, and improving organizational capability” to “mobilizing the entire team to satisfy senior leaders, package results that please management, and support the manager’s personal image.” When team members are consumed by this model for a long time, their mental and physical health, work enthusiasm, and trust in the organization are gradually exhausted.

What is even more concerning is that Tracy does not seem able to provide the team with clear, stable, and measurable business objectives. If a manager cannot clearly tell the team which customers they are trying to win, what problems they are solving, what value they are creating, and how success will be measured, the team will inevitably fall into endless reporting, alignment, slide revisions, and emotional pressure.

This is not normal high-performance management. It is a very dangerous management signal.

If employee satisfaction in a department remains low, intent to leave stays high, and team members generally feel suppressed and exhausted, the organization should not only look at polished reporting results. It should seriously examine the management style behind them. A manager should not be allowed to build an upward-facing image while making the entire team pay the price.

A truly excellent manager should secure resources upward, protect the team downward, and create customer value externally — not flatter upward, pressure downward, and generate anxiety internally.

Let us talk about Vertical.

If I were to evaluate the current Vertical organization, I would say it is a highly confusing organization, and in many cases, frontline teams struggle to understand its real value. The Vertical system led by YDH is, in theory, supposed to provide industry insight, customer breakthroughs, cross-BU collaboration, and growth acceleration. However, based on feedback from many employees, it often appears to be an organization that relies heavily on reporting, presentations, and internal processes to justify its own existence.

I have spoken with many colleagues from Vertical, and the recurring feedback is: “They want to lead through virtue, but they do not have the virtue or capability to match the position.” Although this statement is sharp, it accurately reflects how many employees feel. Sales teams do not necessarily have strong emotional complaints against Vertical. What they have is confusion. Apart from collecting pipelines, making PowerPoint decks that almost nobody seriously reads, and repeatedly asking sales to provide data and materials, how much time does Vertical actually spend on the frontline? What valuable support can it truly provide to sales? How many of YDH and the Vertical Heads have actually spent significant time visiting customers, deeply understanding industries, or personally driving key projects?

We can briefly look at the backgrounds of some industry Heads.

First, there are people who do not appear to have deep industry experience but have been assigned to manage certain industries. For example, CXG was previously responsible for PA DCP business; SSB was formerly a Changchun Territory Manager and had relatively close business interactions with YDH during the RNE period; Tracy was previously an FA PSS manager and came from Rockwell; WYS is a core member of YDH’s small circle and previously led CS MC business; PXS came from MC; and CQC also came from MC. These backgrounds do not automatically mean that they are incapable. However, if someone lacks long-term customer accumulation and industrial understanding in a specific sector but is directly appointed to manage that industry, it is difficult for frontline teams to be truly convinced.

Second, some Vertical Heads have career paths that highly overlap with YDH’s personal work history, such as PXS, CQC, WYS, ZJ, LHH, and others. This high degree of overlap further strengthens the employee perception of circle-based appointments. People naturally ask: were these roles assigned based on industry capability, business performance, and customer experience, or based on previous relationships, internal networks, and management preferences?

More importantly, the management capability of Vertical Heads varies significantly. For example, in the electronics sector led by Tracy, employee intent to leave has reportedly remained among the highest in Vertical in SGES satisfaction surveys. If an organization cannot even maintain basic internal trust and stability among its own employees, how can it truly provide high-quality support to business and sales?

The biggest problem with Vertical today is not that it has no theoretical value. The problem is that, in actual operation, it has not proven its practical value. People who truly understand industries are not sufficiently empowered, while people who do not understand industries are directing them. People closest to customers lack real voice, while those far from customers define the strategy. Frontline teams that actually create business results are repeatedly asked to submit materials, while those responsible for “industry management” rarely bear real accountability for outcomes.

This is the current state of Vertical in the eyes of many employees.

If Siemens China DI truly wants to carry out an effective transformation, it must seriously revisit several questions: How should the long-standing conflict between BU and SU be resolved? How should the responsibilities of TS, TSSH, and SAC be redefined? And is Vertical truly creating industry value, or is it simply creating another management layer and more internal friction?

If these questions are not addressed directly, then the so-called organizational transformation will ultimately become nothing more than another round of power redistribution, rather than a genuine reshaping focused on customers, business, and efficiency.

Now let us look at Domain.

Whether it is FA, PA, or MC, all of them went through some degree of personnel reshuffling during the previous transformation. FA remains strong and continues to hold significant organizational influence. PA, however, has long been associated with various compliance and management controversies. For example, XJ from PA PFA was reportedly complained about in other discussions regarding alleged kickbacks, non-transparent special price approvals, and potential misuse of approval authority for personal benefit. These allegations should not be treated as established facts without an independent investigation. However, the existence of such complaints and concerns already indicates that PA may have governance risks that the company should review seriously.

By comparison, MC appears to be improving in a relatively positive and stable direction. This is partly due to WZL’s rich and senior background in MC, as well as his personal professional capability. At least from the perspective of business understanding and product judgment, the current management of MC seems to be more closely connected to professional competence, rather than relying purely on organizational politics or presentation-driven management.

Now let us return to the current organizational structure.

First, SU has not fundamentally changed, while the workload of frontline TS teams has clearly exceeded a reasonable level. The capability and experience levels among TS employees vary significantly, yet management expects TS to become generalists, or even “superhumans” capable of covering all products, all industries, and all customer issues. But in reality, the technical knowledge gap between different BUs is enormous. It is impossible to complete such a capability transfer simply through organizational slogans. For example, asking an engineer with a historical MC background to support FA-related technical issues is obviously a major professional challenge.

This has led to a very ironic situation. TS, which is often compared to a “community hospital,” is extremely busy and carries a large amount of frontline customer support pressure. Meanwhile, TSSH, which is supposed to function like a “top-tier hospital,” does not appear to have a fully saturated workload and provides very limited support to real business needs. The grassroots level is overloaded, while higher-level resources are not being effectively released. This mismatch itself shows that the current support system has serious structural problems.

SAC is currently one of the most unclear and chaotic roles in terms of functional positioning. It is difficult for many people to clearly explain whether SAC is supposed to provide sales support, industry coordination, resource alignment, or simply serve as another internal management interface. What is even more ironic is that every time a region publishes a newsletter, it often includes a sentence such as “with the support of TS and SAC, we successfully won this project.” Many frontline employees understand that such wording is more about packaging organizational collaboration than accurately reflecting real contribution.

We cannot deny that WHB once built his own power structure within Siemens China DI. In a sense, he created what many employees would describe as his own “China DI dynasty.”

In the past, although the China BUs were still under the governance framework of headquarters, they had considerable influence over price approvals, resource allocation, and business decisions. This helped create the historically strong position of the China BUs, a strength that still exists to some extent today. At the same time, SU had long-standing frustrations with the BUs. The tension between BU and SU has always been a structural issue in the China organization, with both sides often positioned against each other rather than working through truly effective collaboration.

Within such an environment, WHB gradually built a network of influence by placing people close to him, or aligned with him, into key positions across different BUs. At the employee level, there has long been a perception that certain people in critical roles were not merely performing their official responsibilities, but were also directly or indirectly maintaining a fixed management circle and interest structure covering business, pricing, channels, and resource allocation.

To some extent, the weakening of the BU concept at headquarters level during the previous round of transformation was actually a major advantage for WHB. As the original BU boundaries became less dominant and new GM-level positions were reshuffled, he gained the opportunity to place people he trusted into even higher-level and more strategically important roles.

This is why many employees feel that the previous transformation did not truly break the old power structure. Instead, in some areas, it allowed the old circles to continue existing in a different form. WB, YDH, Jasmine, and ZXL have long been perceived by employees as core figures in key positions during the WHB era. Around them, different smaller circles were formed, concentrating premium customers, key resources, pricing authority, and channel influence in the hands of a limited group of people, while many grassroots employees were kept outside the real resource allocation and decision-making system.

What we could clearly observe is that, during the previous round of transformation, many GM-level appointments did not fundamentally change compared with the previous structure. Those GMs who were not aligned with the WHB system, or who did not belong to the established inner circle, either left for various reasons, were marginalized, or gradually lost real influence. Whatever the true reasons behind these changes may have been, the perception among employees is very clear: the organization appeared to be transforming on the surface, but the core power structure was not truly reshaped.

We should also talk about a very unique and long-controversial business within Siemens China CS, or Customer Service: ASP, meaning Approved Service Partner.

ASP was never just a simple service partner program. During YDH’s tenure as CS GM, it was gradually packaged as a strategic initiative and expanded in scale. Under the broader WHB system, it was presented as a key project with growth potential and organizational value. In a sense, ASP looked like YDH’s strategic pledge of loyalty to the WHB system. It could be framed as service ecosystem development, channel penetration, regional coverage expansion, and customer service capability enhancement.

However, ASP has been controversial since the beginning. When we further break down this business, the concept of ASP may reveal unrealistic ambitions and fantasies around service business expansion under WHB and YDH. It may also have been used to package, beautify, or even obscure the companies and parties that directly benefited from it.

First, the charging logic of ASP needs to be thoroughly reviewed.

There has long been a core question among employees and external observers: did Siemens charge ASP companies certain authorization fees, annual fees, certification fees, or similar commercial fees? If such fees were collected, were the business referrals, service orders, regional protection, technical resources, spare parts support, and commercial rights promised before signing actually delivered?

Based on what has been observed in practice, some ASP companies seemed to have purchased an “authorization license” but did not receive sufficient, stable, sustainable, or convertible business resources. In other words, they may have obtained Siemens’ name endorsement, but not enough customer leads, service orders, spare parts business, or repair revenue to match their investment.

At present, it is difficult to find transparent ASP annual fee standards, authorization fee standards, renewal rules, or partner exit mechanisms. Nor is there visible disclosure or systematic review of key data such as average ASP partner revenue, number of referred projects, service order conversion rates, partner ROI, regional coverage quality, or customer satisfaction.

Therefore, the company needs to answer several basic questions:

How many customer leads did each ASP receive on average?
How many actual service orders did each ASP receive?
How much spare parts business, repair revenue, and project conversion did each ASP generate?
Was the revenue sufficient to cover authorization fees, personnel investment, and maintenance costs?
Were the promised regional protection, business referrals, and technical resources actually delivered?
Were resources allocated fairly among different ASPs, or were there clear signs of preferential treatment?

If ASP companies merely paid fees to obtain a nominal status without receiving sufficient business support, then ASP should not simply be described as a successful service ecosystem initiative. It would look more like a packaged authorization-fee model.

Second, the ASP authorized company list, charging standards, and fund flows must be independently reviewed.

If the company truly wants to examine the management and compliance issues within the CS system over the past few years, it should conduct a focused review of ASP authorized companies, admission criteria, charging standards, fund flows, renewal rules, project allocation, service order conversion rates, partner ROI, and internal approval chains.

More importantly, the company needs to conduct a beneficial ownership review of ASP companies. Were any ASP companies connected to relevant managers through family relationships, nominee holding arrangements, former subordinate relationships, historical business dealings, benefit arrangements, or abnormal resource favoritism? Did certain companies receive clearly better project opportunities, pricing support, technical resources, or regional protection than others? Were approval processes artificially relaxed, commercial terms selectively adjusted, or resource allocations inconsistent with normal business logic?

These questions should not remain at the level of verbal explanations. They should be systematically examined through contracts, payment records, project flows, approval records, emails, service order data, and customer conversion data.

Third, ASP should not be evaluated only by strategic packaging. It should be judged by real commercial results.

A healthy service partner system should be able to prove three things at the same time. First, it should bring Siemens better customer coverage and service capability. Second, it should bring ASP partners sustainable commercial returns. Third, its authorization, charging, resource allocation, and project flow should comply with principles of fairness, transparency, and compliance.

If ASP was only packaged as an “ecosystem strategy,” “service network development,” or “regional coverage improvement,” but lacked real orders, real conversion, real ROI, and real customer value, then the project needs to be reassessed.

If ASP’s fee collection, resource allocation, and project referral mechanisms lacked transparency, or if specific companies appeared to benefit abnormally, then this is no longer merely a question of whether the business model succeeded. It may involve conflicts of interest and compliance risks.

Fourth, ASP needs to answer the most fundamental question: did it serve customers, partners, and Siemens, or did it serve the interests of a limited number of people?

For grassroots employees, the real concern is not whether the concept of ASP sounds advanced. The concern is whether it can withstand audit scrutiny, data verification, partner feedback, and customer feedback. If a project has long relied on strategic narratives but cannot clearly explain its charging logic, fulfillment of promises, partner returns, project allocation, and compliance boundaries, employees will naturally raise questions.

Therefore, the company should conduct an independent, transparent, and systematic review of the ASP business. The scope should at least include the list of authorized ASP companies, historical charging standards, contract terms, fund flows, partner ROI, project allocation mechanisms, implementation of regional protection, technical resource support, customer lead distribution, service order conversion, beneficial ownership review, and all relevant internal approval chains.

Only after these issues are clarified can the company determine whether ASP was truly a valuable service ecosystem project, or a special business model whose commercial and compliance questions were hidden behind strategic packaging.

@1gm From the perspective of global layoffs and organizational restructuring, it is highly unlikely that China will remain untouched.

Siemens China has a large employee base, a complex organizational structure, and a relatively large number of functional and support roles. Therefore, if Siemens pushes forward large-scale cost reduction, organizational streamlining, or workforce optimization globally, China will likely have to absorb a significant share of the pressure. In particular, under the combined impact of slower business growth, margin pressure, and the rapid rise of AI tools, roles that are repetitive, process-driven, reporting-oriented, and distant from customers and orders are likely to face greater risk.

However, what truly needs to be adjusted should not be only frontline employees. The management structure of Siemens China needs a real reshuffle.

Many of the problems exposed in China over the past few years were not created by frontline employees. They were the result of bloated management layers, imbalanced leadership appointments, opaque resource allocation, inefficient internal collaboration, and excessive formalism. If the final outcome is simply to cut execution-level employees while keeping the people who created the problems, then so-called cost reduction and efficiency improvement will become nothing more than another downward transfer of pressure.

In my view, frontline sales roles are relatively less likely to be directly affected. The reason is simple: salespeople remain closest to customers, orders, and cash flow. Frontline roles that can generate revenue, maintain customer relationships, and drive project execution still hold irreplaceable value for the company.

By contrast, functional, support, coordination, and reporting-oriented roles are more likely to be affected by the combined forces of AI and organizational streamlining. Many tasks that used to rely on manual data consolidation, slide preparation, information collection, process coordination, and repeated internal alignment may increasingly be replaced or reduced by automation tools, AI assistants, and flatter organizational structures.

Therefore, if this round of restructuring does happen, the focus should not be on cutting people by simple ratios. The company should instead answer a basic question: which roles truly create customer value, and which roles mainly create processes, reports, and internal friction?

If Siemens truly wants to improve efficiency, it should protect frontline employees who are close to the market and create real business results, while reducing inefficient management layers, eliminating redundant support roles, and carrying out a genuine structural reshuffle of the China management team.

Why the comment zone is mainly about Siemens China? How would the 20,000 layoffs distributed? Thanks.

Regarding the management issues across several BUs in China over the past years, many employees have their own understanding of what happened.

At the employee level, there has long been a perception that during the WHB era, relatively fixed networks of management influence and interest representation were formed across several key BUs. For example, YDH in MC & MTS, ZXL in FA, and WB in CS have often been perceived by employees as key figures closely connected to the senior power structure at that time.

Nobody wants to present unverified internal rumors as established facts. However, the fact that such perceptions have persisted for so long already shows that there are serious concerns within the organization regarding the transparency of leadership appointments, resource allocation, project decisions, and potential interest relationships.

What the company should really pay attention to is not merely a few individual names, but the governance issues reflected behind these perceptions. Why have certain individuals remained in key positions through different rounds of organizational restructuring? Why have core resources and decision-making power in some BUs appeared to remain concentrated within a small number of fixed circles? Why do many frontline employees feel that capability, performance, and professional experience are not the real determining factors for job security and career opportunities?

If the company truly wants to rebuild trust among employees in China, it cannot stop at personnel changes or new slogans. It should conduct a systematic review of past leadership appointments, project flows, supplier relationships, channel resource allocation, and potential conflicts of interest across key BUs.

Employees are not asking for a witch hunt. What they want is a basic answer: have the old management circles, interest networks, and protective power structures truly been dismantled? And will the new organization genuinely return to a path of fairness, professionalism, transparency, and compliance?

@1fw When the economy is rising, prosperity can cover up almost everything. When business is growing, the organization appears peaceful and successful. Management can package market tailwinds as personal capability, describe industry cycles as strategic victories, and attribute the hard work of frontline employees to their own leadership.
But when the business comes under real pressure, when growth slows and profits shrink, the problems that have long been hidden beneath the surface begin to emerge all at once. Factional culture, rent-seeking behavior, imbalanced resource allocation, management incompetence, and avoidance of responsibility all become exposed under pressure.
When times are good, everyone talks about vision, culture, and success stories. When times are difficult, the true level of an organization’s governance, management principles, and leadership logic is finally revealed.
To put it bluntly: in good times, everything looks harmonious; in hard times, chaos reveals itself. And the ones who suffer the most are always the people at the bottom — those closest to customers and most responsible for delivering real results.

I read all comments up to now. I feel that comments from Siemens China are just typical complaints when biz is going low. They would never mention how happy they were when they were in good years.

Power structure of any company is same as an autocratic country, power top down not bottom up. I think Siemens China employees must be used to the mechanism and outcome in their day to day life with their officials. If they complain about the employer, I guess they have a better object to complain about. They don’t own the company but they own their country.

@1dv The controversies surrounding WB’s management style and potential conflicts of interest seem to have been discussed for quite some time. As for his relationship with JHH, do people think it might be closer than that of a typical manager and subordinate? Also, has anyone heard the rumors about MQ allegedly “paying to secure a promotion”?

the drama here is even more interesting than Trump’s posts.

I have to admit, the stories from China are always the most dramatic.

@1e0 If that’s the case, China really is more complicated than I thought.