Thread regarding Wells Fargo & Co. layoffs

Wait didn’t Christal Kennedy come in to clean all this up with the COO? She claimed victory on a lot of things that haven’t worked. Glad she is gone to go sc--w up another company’s risk area.

Its all political at this point. Pre 2017/18 this was bank was know as the flawless best run bank in the world, almost no risk issues. After the gov't regulators were screamed at, they ran around making up bullsh-t. The good people in risk left and replaced by id--ts, who got yelled at even more by regulators, rinse and repeat. That's the fu----g truth. They have 4X the headcount they used to in Risk.

I was in risk and pointed out many many problems but was told I was the problem. Risk is a run away train ! Managers and mistresses making bank and ignoring the best employees advice on risk ! I quit saved my sanity and soul . Pure greed devils they are !

True story (I used to work in Internal Audit, joined just before the SP scandal erupted in 2016). I used to listen to an Executive Audit Director tell people that Claudia and Carrie ran the best risk management shop in Wells Fargo. I sh-t you not! Turns out, that was a LIE!. First of all, both of those ladies had that executive audit director by the BA--S which is not how things work with the IA charter. Or how they are supposed to. Second, the top internal audit people at that time were more interested in seceding to the demands and bullying of the 1st and 2nd line executives than doing what was right for the enterprise, its shareholders, customer and employees, hence why Charlie has said time and again the bank didn't have the right people, culture, process or technology in place then. It is outrageous how it could of ever gotten that bad at a company so regulated and with vast resources, but it did.

The Carrie Tolstedt show was up and running in the early 2000's and the fake account nonsense slowly built up to an extreme level. When I started as a personal banker I would be given a stack of Hogan/3270 printouts with "ICC" on them (debit cards) at the end of each day and would send the customers debit cards without speaking to them per my branch manager's direction. This was 2002.

"We have a risk team that is supposedly monitoring everything so things like this don't happen. When will this team be held accountable for ignoring all the red flags?"

I guess you missed this (and at the same time, the OCC also issued a similar announcement about David Julian - chief auditor and Hope Hardison - CAO) Carrie T, Claudia (her compliance officer) and the head of community bank audit that reported to Julian (can't remember his name) are all still fighting settlement:

Former Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Chief Risk Officer Michael Loughlin has agreed to the OCC's issuance of a Consent Order to cease and desist and to pay a civil money penalty of $1.25 million.

The Comptroller found and Loughlin neither admitted nor denied, that:

From 2010 to his retirement in 2018, Respondent was the Bank’s Chief Risk Officer. He reported to the Risk Committee of the Board and reported administratively to the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”).
Among other things, Respondent was responsible for providing credible challenge to business leaders on activities that may lead to elevated risk, for ensuring proactive identification of emerging risk issues and their potential effect on the company’s aggregate risk profile, and for timely escalating risk concerns to the Chair of the Risk Committee, the Risk Committee, and/or the CEO.
Respondent was a member of the Bank’s Operating Committee from 2007 to 2018 and was on the Bank’s Board of Directors from November 2006 through December 2014.
Respondent served on several management committees with oversight roles related to sales practices misconduct.1 He was chair of the Enterprise Risk Management Committee and served on the Team Member Misconduct Executive Committee and the Incentive Compensation Steering Committee.
From at least 2002 until October 2016, the Community Bank, the largest line of business within the Bank, had a systemic sales practices misconduct problem.
The root cause of the systemic sales practices misconduct was the Community Bank’s business model which imposed unreasonable sales goals on its employees along with unreasonable pressure to meet these goals. Additionally, the Bank’s controls were ineffective and were not reasonably designed to detect or prevent the misconduct.
By 2012 at the latest, Respondent should have known about the systemic sales practices misconduct problem in the Community Bank, its root cause, and the inadequate controls in place to prevent and detect such misconduct.
From at least 2013, Respondent’s efforts were inadequate in advising the CEO and the Board of Directors that the Community Bank’s business model posed significant risks and incentivized illegal activity, that the relevant controls were deficient, and that the Community Bank was not resolving the problem.
As Chief Risk Officer and Head of Corporate Risk, Respondent failed to fulfill the incentive compensation oversight responsibilities of Corporate Risk to ensure the risks of incentive compensation programs were adequately understood and managed appropriately throughout the Bank.
Respondent co-authored three annual incentive compensation risk impact memoranda in 2014, 2015, and 2016 that were provided to the Human Resources Committee of the Board of Directors and to the OCC. Respondent rated the Community Bank’s management of sales practices “satisfactory” in each memorandum and recommended no incentive compensation adjustments for Community Bank senior leadership related to sales practices until 2016, when he recommended minimal adjustments related to sales practices.
Respondent’s failures to fulfill his responsibilities by appropriately addressing or escalating sales practices risks known to him fostered the illegal and unsafe and unsound sales practices misconduct that existed within the Community Bank and allowed it to perpetuate for years.

I read these message and this must be the d-mbest of the d-mb on this message board, 100% brain dead clueless ghetto trash.

@cvr most of my eye rolls last longer than these new employees' tenures here.

Eff Carrie — she should be in prison.

Happy Holidays to (mostly) everyone else.

Not a popular opinion, but if you’ve been here a while - I do an eye roll. Your tenure is not something to brag about. Even if you have no ties to Carrie (whatever her name is) - I assume anyone here before 2016 is affiliated w/ the scandal. I assume you are involved— no matter what you say. Many newbies think that no matter how polite we are being. If you don’t want that reaction then leave. This is your reality. Charlie isn’t crying if you exit. It’s easier to explain outside of the bank.

We have a risk team that is supposedly monitoring everything so things like this don't happen. When will this team be held accountable for ignoring all the red flags?

In all instances it was a lack of controls that caused the problems not some illegal scheme. It was senior leaders not allowing sufficent staffing and review processes to prevent abuse. Thats why we are still held captive to the regulators. Fake account scandal had a process that paid bonuses for new accounts before an account with zero balance showed up as an exception after two cycles. Active duty service members cars were repossessed because again, no controls to look at the proper flags in the system before spitting out repossession orders to a third party. Overdraft fees was charging overdraft fees on transactions we allowed (POS, ATM) due to sufficient balance and then we post some check that comes in before the prior approved transaction but we charged OD fees on those instead. They were smaller dollar so more of them to charge. GAP insurance scandal was also just several areas of neglect and insuffient warning to our cutomers that we were now charging them for auto insurance after being notified their insurance lapsed. Problem was the customer would get their insurance back and we never stopped charging them.

My point is that nothing, except the fake accounts, was illegal IF we had done it correctly. Lack of controls, no proper ongoing reviews, insufficient customer communication, outsourcing, short staffing to save $$ all contributed to ineptness.

Senior leaders. Those in charge and with the authority to make big decisions. Look at the top. Things will never change until there is accountability at the most senior levels.