@1zfr+1p26qzc3 - I appreciate your post regarding the benefits of selling IH, but here are my counterpoints.
First, IH should be considered almost akin to a “bond” holding in a volatile investment portfolio. A business, that if run moderately well, provides an annuity stream that offsets the cyclical volatility in our core business (which is obviously very rate/economically sensitive). IH has performed that role admirably over many business cycles.
Second, an insurance business should actually be a net positive for the balance sheet. Berkshire Hathaway is one of (if not THE) most effective and efficient managers of balance sheet capital in the world. While BH utilizes the funding/float portion in ways we obviously can’t, the business as a whole has been a cornerstone of their success. Buffet constantly lauds the market diversifying benefits of insurance to his other economically sensitive businesses.
Third, insurance was a material part of BB&T prior to the merger, and BB&T traded at a significantly higher multiple than SunTrust. How could that be if it was such a financial liability? None other than the great allocator of capital Bill Rogers lauded IH mere months ago.
Which all begs the question, why sell now with economic storm clouds on the horizon? The answer to me is crystal clear. IH is our most attractive asset, and the private equity group has been chomping at the bit to get the rest of it (hmmm, wonder why?!?). IH was a quick and easy capital raise to continue to support this farce of an executive team.
I fail to see how this sale had anything to do with “improving” Truist. In fact, I strongly doubt that entered the decision criteria. Just another move supporting an undeniable trend - a “win” for executive management at the expense of every other stakeholder.