Here's an excerpt:
Throughout the Class Period, Defendants reported that Oracle’s cloud revenues were growing at extremely rapid rates, and repeatedly emphasized that the “hypergrowth” in Oracle’s all-important cloud business demonstrated that it had successfully pivoted its business model to cloud-based technology. In addition, Defendants attributed that growth to a variety of supposedly legitimate factors and initiatives, including that its “products are better” its “sales force is better” and its “ability to implement is better.” In truth, Oracle drove sales of cloud products in two ways: (i) by threatening its customers with very costly “audits” of their use of the Company’s non-cloud software unless the customers agreed to shift their business to Oracle’s cloud programs; and (ii) offering customers large discounts on on-premise products if they accepted short-term cloud contracts that they did not want and would likely not use. The use of such tactics concealed the lack of real demand for Oracle’s cloud services, making Oracle’s cloud growth unsustainable and ultimately driving away customers.
The truth was revealed starting on December 14, 2017, when the Company disclosed that cloud revenue growth had stagnated and forecasted significantly slower sales growth for its cloud business. On March 19, 2018, Oracle reported even slower cloud growth, heightening the market’s concern regarding Oracle’s cloud business. On June 14, 2018, JP Morgan issued a report indicating that it had performed a large-scale survey of Chief Information Officers and found that Oracle was highly unpopular due to its business tactics and the lack of value in its cloud products. Finally, on June 19, 2018, Oracle reported that it would no longer separately report financial results or guidance for its cloud business, decreasing transparency as to cloud revenue growth. As a result of these disclosures, the price of the Company’s stock declined significantly.