Looking back at Inge, I think his biggest mistake was failing to recognize the core contradiction in his strategic vision. His stated pillars were innovation, business transformation, and portfolio management. Innovation is fine—frankly, it’s obligatory to mention, whether or not you truly intend to pursue it. But business transformation and portfolio management proved fundamentally at odds.
The more effort you put into stitching company systems together, the harder it becomes to take them apart—or to integrate acquisitions. The lingering issues with the Solventum spin-off, the offshoring moves made to conjure savings SAP failed to deliver, and the never-fully-integrated KCI acquisition all point to the same thing: Inge’s push for transformation clashed directly with his (and later Mike Roman’s) portfolio strategy of buying and selling assets.
Their approach stands in stark contrast to a company like Berkshire Hathaway, where business units operate independently and simply roll up their results. That model may come with higher operating costs, but it buys something far more valuable: the flexibility to acquire or divest businesses quickly and cleanly.