(PART 4)
Some investors play down the pension underfunding, but the obligations are real. Underscoring this, GE plans to sell $6 billion of debt this year to contribute to its pension plans, in what amounts to a wealth transfer to employees and retirees from shareholders.
The subject that fires up any discussion of GE’s valuation is a possible breakup of the company. That could be tricky to accomplish given the leverage at the industrial business, the pension obligations, and the support that GE provides to GE Capital.
An initial public offering of the health-care business, for instance, would bring cash to GE but also deprive the company of full control of its cash flows.
JPMorgan analyst Stephen Tusa has been bearish on GE, and recently wrote that there is “no easy way out” for GE, whether it stays the course or separates some of its businesses. Tusa was interviewed in Barron’s last fall (“JPMorgan Analyst: The Case Against GE,” Nov. 4, 2017).
Tusa did a sum-of-the-parts analysis in late January and came up with a value of $13 a share, with potential downside to $10 a share. The analyst, who has an Underweight rating and a $14 price target, carries a below-consensus earnings estimate of 88 cents for this year and 85 cents for 2019.
Last week, Tusa updated his analysis to reflect potential sales of GE’s transportation and lighting businesses, an exit to the stake in Baker Hughes, and a partial initial public offering of the health-care business. He still came up with a $13 net asset value.
“Beyond the simplistic math, what sticks out is a portfolio that still is low-growth, with weak free cash flow and too much leverage, raising a question of whether an equity raise is possible,” he wrote.
GE doesn’t need to raise equity now, he added, but still might raise capital to shore up its balance sheet. The company says such a move is unnecessary. It has earmarked $20 billion in proceeds from asset sales, possibly involving transportation and lighting.
“With the leverage GE has at the industrial business and GE Capital, the company has to take care of bondholders first, and that comes at the expense of equity holders,” Tusa says.
In a move it might now regret, GE used proceeds from asset sales at GE Capital to buy back $22 billion of stock in 2016 at an average price of about $30 a share. Buybacks look unlikely in 2018.
LET’S WALK THROUGH Tusa’s sum-of-the-parts analysis. He makes cash-flow assumptions for 2018 based on projected Ebitda for GE’s major businesses, assigns multiples to them, and then subtracts liabilities to come up with an equity value for the company.
He uses ample multiples of 13.5 for aviation and health care, above comparable companies such as Philips (PHG), in health care, and United Technologies, in aircraft engines. Both trade around 11 times projected 2018 Ebitda.
In his analysis, Tusa subtracts the net debt at GE’s industrial business, pension obligations, and a big provision for corporate expenses if the various businesses were separated. His $10-a-share downside calculation reflects potentially less value in GE’s maintenance and equipment contracts, whose underlying assumptions aren’t disclosed. There are also potential liabilities stemming from GE’s ownership of WMC Mortgage, a subprime mortgage company that GE bought in 2004 and sold in 2007.
There is also potential liability related to shareholder lawsuits. GE was sued Friday by a shareholder who accused the company of hiding insurance liabilities and the SEC investigation. A GE spokesperson said, “The company will defend itself against these claims.”
GE faces other shareholder suits related to the drop in its share price.
A swing factor in any valuation of GE is power. The longstanding business is the largest at GE in revenue generation, and has a storied history. Its turbines produce a third of world’s electricity. Profits fell 45%, to $2.8 billion, last year, however, as the company wrote down assets and took restructuring charges.
Bulls use a higher multiple than Tusa’s six times on power, but he argues that the business faces multiyear challenges from the growth of increasingly cheap renewables and competitive pressure from rivals Siemens (SIEGY) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (7011.Japan).
“Gas turbines are one of the most challenged end-markets that I cover from a supply-and-demand perspective,” Tusa says. “The world is moving toward renewables, and ultimately, the gas-turbine market is going to be a global niche. The cost of renewables and storage to produce electricity is below gas and doesn’t have environmental issues.”
GE’s turbines include the massive H-class, which can produce enough power to heat more than 250,000 homes.
GE Power lost a gas-turbine contract to rivals late last year in Brazil, a market it has dominated. Global orders for new gas turbines fell to an estimated 35 gigawatts in 2017, the lowest since 2002, and GE is planning for another decline in 2018 to as low as 30 gigawatts. The power division is undergoing a sweeping restructuring, including the layoff of 12,000 employees.
Things aren’t any better at GE’s renewable-power division, a maker of wind turbines. It has lost further U.S. market share to European rival Vestas Wind Systems (VWS.Denmark), according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, amid continued price declines. Vestas is No. 1 and GE No. 2 in the U.S.
Valuing the power business means understanding the role played by contract assets. They involve long-term services and equipment, mostly in power and aviation. The future profitability of the contracts is based on undisclosed assumptions, and is one reason the company is called a “black box.”
Miller, GE’s CFO, spoke highly of the contracts, calling them “high-margin, high-return” on a November conference call. She described them as 10 to 20 years in length “where customers have predictable maintenance costs in exchange for performance guarantees on equipment.”
Tusa told Barron’s last year that rivals have nothing comparable in size to GE’s contract assets.
THE BULL CASE FOR GE is made by analysts such as Nicholas Heymann of William Blair, who sees a likely bottom in earnings. In a recent client note, he wrote that “once regulatory reviews and shareholder lawsuits are settled or dismissed, we believe GE’s focus on better-than-expected free cash flow and an accelerated pace of asset sales are likely to enable the shares to return to a ‘normalized’ valuation of 20 times trough earnings per share of $1 to $1.07, or a valuation in the $20 to $22 range.”
Inch’s retort to the bulls is that an investor “should pay 20 times earnings for a company with significant growth prospects backed by free cash flow.” GE, he says, doesn’t qualify, noting that “GE may take many years to work out its challenges.” Honeywell, a top-performing industrial company, trades for 19 times projected 2018 earnings.
The next humiliation for GE as a U.S. corporate icon could come if it is dropped from the Dow Jones Industrial Average as a result of its depressed stock price. It is the last remaining original member of the 1896 Dow: Its peers included the U.S. Leather Company and Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad.
With the lowest share price among the Dow 30— Pfizer (PFE) is next at $35—GE is largely irrelevant in an index that is weighted by the prices of the individual stocks, not market values. The committee overseeing the Dow might decide to add a company that can make more of a difference to the index.
If GE is dumped from the Dow industrials, bulls would seize on that as a sign of a bottom. Yet a close look at GE suggests the stock isn’t cheap based on earnings, a sum-of-the-parts analysis, leverage, complexity, and business challenges. GE’s best days may lie in the past.